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ABSTRACT
This paper traces the adjustment process in four Caribbean countries, the Dominican Republic, 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in the 1980s. It uses a number o f economic indicators to try to 
judge the extent to which policy managed to approach its goal o f  "adjustment". It also discusses the issue o f  
privatization, perhaps the second most controversial buzz-word/concept after adjustment itself, to see beyond 
the doctrinaire positions taken in favour or against, how it fits within that panoply o f policy tools necessary 
for economic management.
Privatization is used in its broader sense, to encompass the range o f policy actions which move the 
economy from a State regulated toward a more market regulated basis. The section on privatization, while 
focusing on the State enterprises and the transfer o f  ownership and control away from public to private actors, 
cannot ignore the macroeconomic framework in which this transfer is to take place. Neither can it ignore the 
objectives o f privatization which are increased efficiency and welfare. Deregulation and, in appropriate 
instances, regulation is therefore relevant in the context o f structural adjustment as well as in considering the 
State enterprises, thus illustrating the strong link between the two issues captioned.
The paper suggests that the twin oil price increases in the period 1973 and 1979-1981, constituted 
severe shocks to most economies worldwide, including many Caribbean economies, and set in train a plethora 
o f varying responses. In some, the initial policy responses were adequate to the initial task, In others, 
inappropriate policy responses created a further series of shocks to their economies. In the longer term, these 
early shocks themselves created a number o f after-shocks, as different countries adjusted with varying rates 
o f speed and effectiveness. It suggests that these after-shocks are still ricochetting around the globe to cause 
new and complex further rounds o f compensating adjustment.
For the Caribbean, the economies of the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Jamaica are studied in 
some detail as they illustrate the intricate conjuncture o f  external and domestic policy shocks in the 1970s. 
For these economies and for Trinidad and Tobago, the second oil shock is taken as the departure point for 
the analysis. Nevertheless, an understanding o f developments in the 1970s is necessary for any comprehension 
o f the genesis o f the disequilibrium and the debt crisis, itself a major complicating factor in the adjustment 
process in the 1980s. Developments in the 1970s, especially in Guyana and Jamaica, but also in Trinidad and 
Tobago provide insights into the link between public ownership and economic disequilibrium and hence, in 
part at least, a better understanding o f the subsequent call for the divestment o f  public assets and for 
privatization.
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INTRODUCTION
It is probably no exaggeration to suggest that 
the issue o f "adjustment" has dominated the policy 
agenda in Caribbean countries throughout the 1980s. 
For some countries adjustment became a public issue 
after 1977, although the first oil shock in late 1973 
meant that policy responses should have been initiated 
as early as 1974. Not surprisingly, many years o f  high 
profile debate on the pros and cons o f adjustment itself, 
accompanied by sometimes severe policy impacts on 
die standard o f living o f  a number o f people, has 
shrouded the issue in considerable controversy and has 
for the first time brought the most arcane issues o f  
economic policy into the public arena and indeed into 
everyday discussion in the Caribbean.
This paper attempts to chronicle the events o f  
adjustment in four CDCC member countries in the 
decade o f the 1980s, while using a number o f economic 
indicators to trace the extent to which policy has 
managed to approach its goal o f  "adjustment". At the 
same time it tries to discuss the issue o f  privatization, 
perhaps the second most controversial buzz­
word/concept after adjustment itself, and to see beyond 
the doctrinaire positions taken in favour or against, 
how it fits within that panoply o f  policy tools for 
economic management.
Privatization is seen in its broader sense to 
encompass the range o f  policy actions which move the 
economy from a State regulated to a more market 
regulated basis. The section on privatization, while 
focusing on the State enterprises and the transfer of 
ownership and control away from public to private 
actors, cannot ignore the macroeconomic framework in 
which this transfer is to take place. Neither can it 
ignore the objectives o f privatization which are 
increased efficiency and welfare. Deregulation and, in 
appropriate instances, regulation is therefore relevant in 
the context o f  structural adjustment as well as in 
considering the State enterprises, thus illustrating the 
strong link between the two issues captioned.
In the course o f the discussion it is hoped to 
contribute to the debate in a number o f ways, to 
answer to concerns o f  common people which question 
the very possibility o f  adjustment itself, framed in the 
common question of, "How is it possible that we have 
been adjusting for over a decade and we have not
managed to achieve it?" Or alternatively, "Can 
developing countries such as ours, vulnerable to 
external vicissitudes ever adjust?" It also hopes to 
contribute to the discussion on privatization, to revisit 
its rationale, outline some o f the measures used, results 
achieved and lessons learned from the cases studied.
The discussion might usefully begin with an 
attempt to define how the term adjustment is used in 
this paper. It encompasses those policies relating to 
short-term equilibrium as well as some macro- 
economic elements o f  a medium-term nature related to 
transformation o f existing production patterns. It does 
not however go into detailed sectoral policies. It is 
conceptually useful to make a distinction between 
equilibrium and transformation, both o f  which should, 
however, be mutually consistent and operate in 
harmony to achieve structural adjustment. In this paper 
the former will be used to refer to the basic economic 
"housekeeping", that is, the achievement and 
maintenance, more or less, o f  macroeconomic 
equilibrium with the focus on the fiscal balances, the 
external balances mainly the current account, the 
external debt and economic growth rates used as a 
rough indicator o f what is happening while the process 
o f equilibration continues. In short, it seeks to examine 
how policy has managed the external and internal 
accounts in an economic space, that is, in large part 
exogenously determined and not amenable to significant 
expansion in the short term. In this context, the 
examination will seek to see if  income and expenditure 
are contained within limits that do not necessitate the 
accumulation o f liabilities which will hinder future 
growth. This rudimentary set o f indicators deal mainly 
with short-term economic activities through the 
instrumentality o f the annual budget exercise.
On the other hand, the issue o f transformation 
might be equated with the broader subject of  
development itself which is concerned with enlarging 
the economic space and improving the quality o f life. 
These concerns are related to the medium-to longer- 
term growth path and seek to secure the more effective 
and complete use o f all domestic resources, in the 
context o f  anticipated changes at home and abroad and 
in a manner that is sustainable over time.
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Clearly, the two issues of equilibrium and 
transformation are very closely interrelated, ideally 
requiring policies which should be mutually 
reinforcing. In the early stages o f the adjustment 
process, focus was placed almost exclusively on short­
term balance. As perceptions about the need to expand 
the economic space grew and the role that the State 
could most effectively play in economic development 
shifted, changes were made in the regulatory 
framework to improve the functioning o f markets and 
permit unambiguous market signals to guide the 
decisions o f economic actors. This process of  
privatization encompassed a range o f  policies including 
the deregulation and divestment which will be 
examined in some detail.
Any economy through time is subject to a 
number o f shocks, which may derive from external or 
domestic sources. In the former case, they usually 
derive from the changing patterns of supply and 
demand o f  trading partners. In the latter case, they may 
be due to unforseen natural disasters or shocks deriving 
from policy which might reduce external 
competitiveness or artificially increase the demand for 
imports. Usually, if  not allowed to accumulate, these 
shocks are absorbed in the normal course o f national 
management and the short-term course continues on 
some manageable equilibrium or near equilibrium. 
Sometimes shocks are sufficiently severe and far 
reaching, or come together in particularly awkward 
combinations to require rapid and complicated analysis 
of the prevailing new situation and the implementation 
o f fairly drastic departures from familiar policy norms. 
Faulty diagnosis or slow response might allow a
situation to deteriorate and would extract a price in the 
form o f a more difficult and protracted adjustment.
This paper suggests that the twin oil price 
increases in the period 1973 and 1979-1981, constituted 
severe shocks to most economies worldwide, including 
many Caribbean economies, and set in train a plethora 
o f varying responses. In some, the initial policy 
responses were adequate to the initial task. In others, 
inappropriate policy responses created a further series 
o f shocks to their economies. In the longer term, these 
early shocks themselves created a number o f after­
shocks, as different countries adjusted with varying 
rates o f speed and effectiveness and these after-shocks 
are still ricochetting around the globe to cause new and 
complex further rounds o f compensating adjustment.
For the Caribbean, the economies o f the 
Dominican Republic, Guyana and Jamaica are studied 
in some detail as they illustrate the intricate conjuncture 
o f external and domestic policy shocks in the 1970s. 
For these economies and for Trinidad and Tobago, the 
second oil shock is taken as the departure point for the 
analysis. Nevertheless, an understanding of 
developments in the 1970s is necessary for any 
comprehension o f the genesis o f the disequilibrium and 
the debt crisis, itself a major complicating factor in the 
adjustment process in the 1980s. Developments in the 
1970s, especially in Guyana and Jamaica, but also in 
Trinidad and Tobago provide a perception o f the link 
between public ownership and economic disequilibrium 
and hence, in part at least, a better understanding o f  
the subsequent call for the divestment o f public assets 
and for privatization.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
The oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979-1981 
provide significant clues to any understanding o f the 
turbulent years o f  the 1970s and the complex task of 
adjustment faced by many developing countries in the 
1980s. The fivefold increase in petroleum prices in 
1973 provided a significant discontinuity with past 
events. It managed almost overnight to transfer an 
enormous block o f resources from the major petroleum 
consuming countries, both developing and developed, 
to the major producers. Among the oil dependent 
developed and developing countries alike, the oil price 
increases changed relative competitive positions to 
favour those having lesser dependence on oil and 
products less intense in energy use.
Perceptions and, therefore, the policy 
responses to the oil price rise differed, those countries 
possessing political leverage seeing the price increase 
as short-term and amenable to political pressure. Much 
effort was therefore expended by developed and 
developing countries to mitigate the impacts o f  the oil 
price rise on their economies. The developed countries 
sought to exert political pressure to secure price 
reductions and later special trading arrangements to 
recycle oil surpluses. The developing ones sought to 
establish political alliances, either globally through the 
non-aligned movement, or regionally by virtue o f trade, 
ideological or religious ties to secure guaranteed 
supplies, special oil credits and other increased capital 
flows to finance deficits. In both these sets o f  countries 
the short-term macroeconomic balances were neglected 
and longer-term fundamental restructuring took a 
second order o f priority to political activities.
For those countries having high petroleum 
dependence yet weak prospects o f  political leverage, 
the short-term prospects seemed dim and they set in 
train frenzied efforts to adjust to the changed factor 
costs. As macroeconomic policies filtered through 
these societies and prices were passed through, many 
successful firms were shocked out o f their customary 
habits and into new and innovative modes o f action. 
The outputs o f  many o f these firms changed to reduce
The global environment the dependence upon natural raw materials and high 
energy inputs, while the modes o f production also 
changed to emphasize high efficiency. Energy, 
considered by some to be the crucial factor o f  
production, especially after the price increase, was 
about to be supplanted by information.
Widely differing reactions to a situation o f  
global uncertainty brought forth changes in relative 
economic power. They caused a high degree o f  
instability in the 1980s, as new economic actors came 
to the fore changing the traditional trading relations. 
These in turn affected the familiar external payments 
patterns, exchange rates, investment flows and created 
a new round o f frictions predicated upon changed 
economic power.
Some o f these stresses were particularly acute 
in the developing countries, especially those that 
depended upon minerals export and imported energy. 
Stresses were also acute for those that had attempted to 
finance the deficits in the early to mid-1970s with 
cheap recycled oil surpluses. For they had to face the 
second oil shock between 1979 - 1982 having 
accumulated large debts, greatly increased debt 
servicing burdens because o f rapidly rising interest 
rates. They also suffered from reduced demand for 
their raw materials exports. The minerals exporters felt 
the effects o f  the debt crisis early, to be followed soon 
after by the oil exporters, as oil demand and prices 
declined steadily with the global economy. For the 
petroleum exporters, greatly expanded consumption 
patterns and increased public investments in the boom 
years could not be reduced in the short term, so that 
reserves were depleted and debts increased.
These factors manifested themselves in the 
growth performance o f  the various developing country 
groupings over the 1980s. Those countries that had 
developed the capability and specialised in the export 
of manufactures had a sustained good growth 
performance throughout the decade. Annual per capita 
product grew on average by 3.2 per cent, although 
performance declined towards the end or the decade as 
the global economy contracted.
4
The fuel exporting countries had a steady 
decline in per capita product, averaging -1.6 per cent 
per annum and recording slight growth in only two of 
the 11 years, in 1989 and 1990, Minerals exporters 
faced the full brunt o f  the global uncertainty, achieving 
growth in five o f  the 10 years yet with wild swings in 
performance. Overall the per capita product grew on 
average by 1.4 per cent.
The genesis o f disequilibrium
The Caribbean was not immune to these global 
developments. Most countries, except Trinidad and 
Tobago and to a lesser extent Barbados, were oil 
importers. They faced a severe adjustment problem 
after the first oil shock that was externally derived. But 
the shock was, in some respects, greater for the 
minerals exporters among them, the Dominican 
Republic, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica, since they were 
particularly dependent upon petroleum for their 
downstream mining activities. Oil price increases 
shocked their economies by drastically increasing the 
import bill, while simultaneously reducing the medium- 
term competitive position o f their industries vis-à-vis 
those minerals exporters that were also energy self- 
sufficient, such as Venezuela and Australia.
The immediate impact o f  the first oil shock 
was cushioned and accordingly the adjustment process 
was deferred for some o f them by virtue o f  windfall 
earnings accruing from sugar and bauxite/alumina 
exports and after 1974 from export taxes. While these 
earnings could have been used to help the adjustment 
process by setting in train new energy conserving 
investments, such as tourism in the Dominican 
Republic or Jamaica, or agricultural output in Guyana, 
they were used to raise the subsidies for energy and 
food items, increase the public service and to finance 
the expansion o f State enterprises. Even the substantial 
funds accruing from these sources were insufficient 
for the task. Moreover they were ephemeral, so that 
when they started to decline debt accumulated rapidly 
in these countries. For these countries also debt 
severely complicated policy in the 1980s and remained 
an unwanted legacy in the 1990s. So that coterminous 
with the external shock o f oil there was a further 
shock, deriving from domestic policies.
To understand the need for structural 
adjustment, which began in earnest in the 1980s and 
continues to the present, it is necessary to be aware of
the economic structure and policies applicable to these 
countries before 1980 and even before 1973. The 
section entitled "The genesis o f disequilibrium in the 
Caribbean - the 1970s" provides a brief outline o f  the 
genesis o f  disequilibrium in three o f  the four countries 
surveyed. The fourth country, Trinidad and Tobago, 
was also in disequilibrium. In the 1970s it was, 
however called a boom, with the underlying distortions 
to non-petroleum production disguised by large inflows 
o f foreign exchange. At that time scant regard was paid 
to the ’Dutch disease’ pervading the economy, with 
policy emphasis being placed on absorption and 
distribution o f the new-found wealth. This emphasis 
was to change as the windfall ended in the early 1980s 
and adjustment o f a more familiar type began soon 
after that.
Adjustment and privatization policies
The 1980s was generally regarded to be a lost 
decade for many Caribbean countries as they became 
bogged down while readjusting their economies to face 
drastically changed circumstances. All o f the four 
countries chosen as case studies were minerals 
exporters as they were most severely affected by these 
changes. Three o f them, the bauxite producers were 
already in severe disequilibrium at the beginning o f the 
decade. The fourth, Trinidad and Tobago, the sole 
exporter o f petrochemicals, suffered the shock o f  
collapsing oil prices and went into disequilibrium soon 
after that.
In the Dominican Republic, a new phase in 
its recent history was reached in 1966. This saw a 
return to internal stability after a period o f civil conflict 
following the overthrow o f the Trujillo dictatorship. 
These developments at the domestic level coincided 
with an external environment that was conducive to 
rapid growth. Accordingly, for the period 1966-1976, 
GDP growth averaged 7.6 per cent. During this 10- 
year period, fiscal policies that included a freeze on the 
size and wages o f the public sector, were quite 
restrained, although deficits were incurred. The deficits 
were nevertheless sustainable, for at the end o f the 
1960s total foreign debt was 27 per cent o f GDP, and 
had actually fallen by 1976. Reserves increased steadily 
during the period.
The period after 1977 provides an example o f  
the high cost o f  postponed adjustment. As was the case 
with Guyana and Jamaica the commodities boom o f the
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early 1970s provided the means to cushion the impacts 
of the first oil shock. But adjustment was further 
postponed even when the boom had run its course and 
surpluses were no longer available for the purpose. 
Renewed attempts were made to insulate against the 
effects o f the second oil shock and to emphasize 
economic growth, with consequent rapid erosion of 
public savings, the foreign reserves and the external 
debt.
The Dominican Republic entered the 1980s 
facing several adverse external developments and with 
an economy that was weakened by inappropriate 
domestic policies. Terms o f trade shocks were caused 
by volatile sugar and minerals export prices, the former 
reaching a sharp peak in 1981, and oil price increases 
which caused the import bill for this commodity to 
increase 10-fold between 1973-1980. There was also a 
deterioration in exports, the volume index declining by 
20 per cent between 1978-1982, caused by the 
recession in the developed countries and consequent 
reduced demand for sugar, bauxite and ferro-nickel. 
The third element o f the external deterioration was 
caused by increasing global interest rates, which tripled 
the cost o f debt service between 1978-1982. 
Simultaneously, domestic performance in manufactures 
began to decline and fiscal revenues began to contract.
Adequate domestic policy responses to the 
external shocks were not forthcoming in 1980s, 
although better progress was made in the theoretically 
more difficult task o f  finding export alternatives to 
sugar, than on establishing fiscal balance. Accordingly, 
once the determination was made to adjust the fiscal 
side, in 1990, the goal was achieved fairly rapidly.
Macroeconomic policy passed through three 
phases, beginning in 1982, 1985 and 1990,
respectively. In the first phase, faltering attempts were 
made to adjust the economy, but this resulted in 
stagnation in 1984 and fairly severe economic 
contraction in 1985. In the second phase, attempts were 
made to stimulate the economy and following a change 
of government, while many external sector policies 
remained, fiscal policy was used to stimulate the 
economy, mainly through increased construction. This 
was intended to reactivate economic growth, and 
managed to do so in 1986 and 1987, but at a cost o f 
widening the external deficit, postponing the fiscal 
adjustment and increasing the rate o f inflation. After 
that, growth contracted, as the strategy was 
unsustainable. This in its turn fuelled inflation that
increased on average by over 50 per cent per annum 
between 1988-1991.
The third phase began in May 1990, when the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) was initiated. Its 
objectives were reducing inflation, returning to growth, 
eliminating the deficit, unifying the exchange rate and 
initiating several policy reforms. By 1992, most o f the 
objectives set for the NEP had been met, in so far as 
stabilization was concerned. The challenge of 
maintaining stable growth over the medium term, 
however, remains.
The portfolio o f  public enterprises had a 
somewhat different genesis in the Dominican Republic 
than in the other countries studied, in that it came 
about almost by accident. Except public utilities, which 
as in most other countries were State-owned, many 
State enterprises came about by nationalizing the assets 
o f the Trujillo estate in 1961. They were deemed to be 
the national patrimony. Currently, the State enterprises 
consist o f  the Dominican Electricity Corporation 
(CDE), the Dominican Corporation for State 
Enterprises (CORDE), the State Sugar Council (CEA), 
the price stabilization institute and several other small 
enterprises. CORDE was formed in 1966 as the 
umbrella organization to administer the non-sugar 
enterprises o f the Trujillo portfolio. It was subsequently 
expanded to include other activities. By 1987 the 
portfolio o f CORDE included the national airline, two 
mines, an insurance company, a car dealership, a real 
estate business and 17 manufacturing enterprises. These 
produced cement, glass, paper, vegetable oils, shoes, 
tobacco, chocolate, nails, sacks and ropes, textiles, 
paints, milled grains, leather and car batteries. It 
included salt mines and refineries and marble and 
plaster mines. Previously it had also administered a 
hotel, hardware stores and a disco.
In the 22 years for which data are available, 
CORDE has recorded a deficit in 17 years. While 
CORDE is justified by the argument that it performs a 
welfare function it has been sustained by taxpayers. 
Savings o f the public sector enterprises as a whole 
became negative in 1979 and the deficit incurred by 
them grew to 3.8 per cent o f GDP by 1980. Deficits 
exceeding 0.5 per cent o f  product were incurred in all 
years in the 1980s. Despite these huge losses there was 
no sustained effort for the rehabilitation, rationalization 
or privatization o f public sector enterprises. The 
possible reasons suggested for this inaction were: 1) the 
firms met political needs and their sale would have
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caused unemployment and tighter accounting controls;
2) they could provide cross-subsidies to the weaker 
enterprises, thus sustaining employment in them; and,
3) careful scrutiny would make explicit their losses, 
and expose the failure o f  government to operate them 
efficiently, evidence that was concealed by transfers. 
In the sugar industry, privatization was linked to the 
controversial question o f land reform, while CDE, the 
electricity corporation, was so large that foreign 
participation, a politically sensitive solution, might be 
necessaiy to achieve privatization. Only recently, in the 
NEP, has consideration been given to privatization but 
this policy is still in its infancy.
The immediate post-Independence phase in 
Guyana focused on expanding economic and social 
infrastructure through major projects such as sea 
defence, rice rehabilitation, roads, airports, electricity, 
and so on. While the projects for which the debt was 
incurred were not self-liquidating, no difficulty was 
experienced in servicing it since foreign exchange 
earnings had grown faster than the debt, increasing by 
20 per cent between 1966-1970. Moreover, the loans 
were made on concessionary terms, at low interest 
rates and with long grace periods. Accordingly, the 
debt service ratio declined from 4.3 per cent o f  exports 
at Independence to 3.4 per cent in 1970.
At the beginning o f the 1970s all the vital 
signs o f  the economy were fairly healthy. GDP grew 
by 3.5 per cent, the external current account deficit 
rested at 9 per cent o f  GDP while the fiscal deficit was 
one half that, at 4.5  per cent. The external debt 
represented 35 per cent o f  GDP. In 1970 Guyana was 
declared a Co-operative Republic, with a central 
objective being that o f securing national ownership and 
control o f  domestic resources. This policy was to have 
far-reaching implications for Guyana’s fiscal and 
external accounts, its debt profile and its overall 
economic performance.
Debt incurred in 1971, due to nationalization 
accounted for 2/3 o f  the 83 per cent increase in the 
foreign debt o f  that year. The cost o f nationalization in 
terms o f the debt was to grow further in coming years. 
By 1976 the external debt consequent on nationalization 
represented 22 per cent o f the total debt and exceeded 
the debt accumulated up to 1970.
By 1977 the economy had begun to contract 
after a period o f steady growth throughout the decade.
An increase o f 3.8 per cent in average annual real GDP 
had been achieved between 1970-1976, but 1977 
recorded a real GDP contraction o f 4.8 per cent, and 
started a phase o f  stagnation that was to continue far 
into the future. For the period 1977-1980 GDP 
declined by 4.2 per cent per annum. With decreased 
export performance and high fiscal deficits, (now 
averaging 22 per cent o f  GDP) the balance o f payments 
collapsed, with the deficit on current account averaging 
20 per cent o f GDP for each o f the five years. By 
1980 the external debt had increased to 122 per cent of 
GDP with the internal debt accounting for a similar 
percentage. Public spending continued to grow despite 
attempts to moderate it between 1976-1978. By 1980 it 
was 62 per cent greater than in 1975.
At the start o f  the 1980s the Guyanese 
economy was already in severe disequilibrium. The 
policy environment and its relationship to adjustment 
since 1980 can be understood if  the survey period is 
seen to represent two distinct phases. The first phase 
covers the period from 1980-1987 and the second phase 
extends from 1988 to the present.
In the first phase, scant effort was made to 
adjust the economy in any consistent fashion and is 
characterised as one o f "Disequilibrium Ignored." 
Initially the economy contracted severely between
1981-1983, because o f  internal and external shocks. 
Slow growth was resumed for the period 1984-1986, as 
the adverse external environment improved. The initial 
growth impulse received in 1984 weakened 
progressively to 1986 so that the economy was in a 
state of torpor, with growth barely positive. The 
enormous debt problem had serious negative effects 
with the country unable to obtain new financing for 
investment or even for suppliers’ credits to finance 
normal trade transactions. Consequent cash flow 
problems forced the use of cash to finance current 
transactions, or where this was not available in 
sufficient quantities, to resort to counter-trade. More 
significantly, individuals resorted to informal measures 
to survive and a significant portion of the economy was 
no longer subject to formal regulation or even 
accounting. For the longer term, the need to operate on 
a day-to-day basis distracted policy attention from the 
long-term measures to resuscitate the economy.
The second phase, which began in 1988 is 
characterised as one of "Committed Adjustment," when
a comprehensive adjustment programme with integrated 
and complementary policies was finally adopted 
together with financing programmes from the 
International Financial Institutions. Given the size of 
the disequilibrium which existed at this time and the 
magnitude of the policy changes necessary, it is not 
surprising that the period 1988-1990 witnessed great 
economic instability and further economic contraction. 
Nevertheless, strong growth was resumed in 1991 and 
sustained in 1992 as the policies seemed to take effect.
This phase of the adjustment programme has 
shown remarkable progress in a short time, yet serious 
problems remain. The short-term indicators are being 
brought into balance but the debt remains to complicate 
the task of adjustment. Many policies have been 
initiated to encourage export performance, notably the 
revised foreign exchange regime, the deregulation of 
prices and the programme of rationalization and 
divestment of the main public sector enterprises. The 
debt complicates the fiscal programme and the 
resumption of repayments has minimised the progress 
made in establishing fiscal balance. A backlog of public 
works focusing on basic infrastructure needs to be 
reduced to stimulate economic expansion. Several 
social programmes have also deteriorated , which unless 
fixed, will further limit the quality of life and human 
performance.
The public sector has dominated the economy 
from the early 1970s, accounting for more than 50 per 
cent of national investment from 1971. This share 
continued to increase throughout the decade resting at 
81 per cent in 1978. The public sector was also the 
major creditor, the major export earner, the major 
employer and accounted for the major share of Gross 
Domestic Product. By 1988, which marked the peak of 
its power before public policy changed, the public 
sector employed 60 per cent of the work force, 
accounted for 70 per cent of GDP and 85 per cent of 
the exports. Under comprehensive administrative 
controls many preferences were accorded to the State 
sector, including access to foreign exchange, credit 
including preferential interest rates and agricultural 
inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides and so on. Despite 
this apparent preeminent position, production and 
export earnings declined rapidly and many government 
enterprises incurred significant losses, requiring 
massive transfers from the national budget.
Once a comprehensive programme of 
adjustment was adopted, the losses incurred by the
State sector needed to be stopped. The ERP introduced 
the issue of privatization here defined broadly to 
include divestment, either in whole as going concerns 
or by sale of the assets of the various entities or by 
management contracts. It also included joint ventures 
and lease agreements. A comprehensive mechanism 
was established, in the Public Corporations Secretariat, 
to oversee the divestment of 32 corporations operating 
under its jurisdiction. Of these, 14 had been totally or 
partially privatized by October 1992. Despite the 
elaborate institutional mechanism for overseeing the 
privatization process, the two largest transactions were 
carried out without the involvement of the Public 
Corporations Secretariat.
Before the election in 1992 the privatization 
process was subject to severe criticism by the then 
opposition party and tended to buttress public 
suspicions that enterprises were being sold too cheaply. 
After the election there was a hiatus, since the change 
of government created a high level of political 
uncertainty about the future of privatization and of the 
ERP as a whole. These fears were partly laid to rest, 
once the privatization programme was resuscitated. It 
was to be governed by open bidding and award 
procedures, fairly priced sales, the offering of company 
shares to the public, buyer assurances to modernize 
and/or expand the enterprises acquired and consumer 
protection. The first task of the privatization committee 
was, however, to review all past sales, so that the 
momentum developed in previous years was lost.
In Jamaica, the 1960s saw relatively high 
rates of economic growth, on average 6.6 per cent 
between 1961-1970. Growth was driven by strong 
external demand for bauxite/alumina and buigeoning 
tourism. The expansion was financed by net private 
capital flows that exceeded the current account deficit 
by almost 9 per cent for the period 1966-1971. This 
surplus, with modest official capital flows created a 
substantial increase in the reserves. For the first three 
years of the 1970s the growth performance of the 
previous decade continued, though at a reduced rate 
averaging 5 per cent; but by 1973 the impact of 
domestic and external factors had caused a change in 
previous trends.
GDP began to decline in 1974, averaging a 
contraction of 3.2 per cent per annum for the rest of 
the decade. The fiscal deficit that was 3 per cent of 
GDP in 1970, widened to 8 per cent in 1974 and
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further to 21 per cent by 1980. The balance of 
payments current account that was in deficit to the tune 
of 11 per cent of GDP in 1970 remained under 10 per 
cent by 1975 because of buoyant export earnings. By 
1980, however, this deficit had fallen to 6 per cent of 
GDP as exports expanded somewhat. There was 
however significant pent up demand for imports that 
were licensed, since public expenditures remained 
strong. The external debt had grown from 29 per cent 
of GDP in mid-decade to 65 per cent by 1980.
During the period economic policy was subject 
to much national debate, IMF policies not achieving a 
consensus within the administration and being 
abandoned by early 1980. The adjustment process was 
therefore hampered by policy inconsistency and 
uncertainty, a factor that also contributed to capital 
flight.
The adjustment programme in Jamaica 
manifested three distinct phases since 1980. The first 
phase, from 1981-1983, attempted adjustment with 
growth. The second phase reverted to orthodox 
adjustment that entailed economic contraction, while 
the third phase was an extension of the second but with 
increasing liberalization in the medium-term policy 
framework.
Domestic economic policies in Jamaica had 
changed by 1981, with the arrival o f a new 
administration. Negotiations had been reopened with 
the IMF and a new Extended Fund Facility agreed. The 
new programme placed heavy reliance on external 
savings to resuscitate the economy. In fact, given the 
political climate in which these new policies were 
adopted, such bilateral inflows were to be forthcoming. 
They may have given the mistaken impression that they 
could on their own, provide sufficient impulses to pull 
the fiscal and external accounts into equilibrium. By 
October 1983 the Extended Fund Facility that was due 
for completion by March 1985 had to be abandoned 
due to an inability to meet the planned targets. The 
fiscal deficit then stood at 20 per cent of GDP as 
compared to the taiget of 10.5 per cent, and the 
Balance of Payments deficit was US$362 million 
compared with a targeted surplus of US$125 million.
The phase of adjustment with growth 
seems to have been misguided. Capital inflows did not 
significantly increase direct investment and even had 
increased exportables been forthcoming they would 
need to have been sufficiently competitive to win
market share in a declining global market. This would 
have been difficult at current levels o f competitiveness. 
The result of increased inflows was increased 
consumption and with it the external debt.
The second phase of orthodox adjustment was 
fairly successful with appropriate polices being applied 
in conjunction with a conducive external environment. 
Exchange rate policy was improved and, though later 
weakened by managed floating, did not become 
significantly dysfunctional in the context of buoyant 
global demand. It was, however, inadequate to respond 
to a major shock, such as that delivered by hurricane 
Hugo.
This combination of external circumstances 
and domestic policies ensured that by 1988 the external 
current account had substantially achieved balance, 
compared to a deficit of 15 per cent of product in 
1985. Some progress was also made on the fiscal 
account, bearing in mind the complicating effect of the 
growing debt burden, itself exacerbated by high 
international interest rates. A fiscal deficit equivalent to 
20 per cent of product in 1983 declined to just over 6.5 
per cent on average for the years 1984-1987. It 
mushroomed, however, to 14 per cent under the burden 
of repairing hurricane damage in 1988. Accordingly, 
the rate of growth of the debt moderated to an average 
growth of less than 7 per cent per annum for the years 
1984-1988. This was in marked contrast to the average 
of 19 per cent per annum, in the preceding three-year 
period between 1980-1983. By the end of 1988 the debt 
had moderated, from a high of 178 per cent of product 
in 1985, to about 115 per cent of GDP and 178 per 
cent of exports. Despite this adjustment, after a period 
of contraction in 1985-1986, growth resumed in 1987.
The third phase, beginning with a new 
administration, manifested policy uncertainty in the 
face of intense exchange rate pressures following the 
hurricane. Its first reaction was to devalue and then fix 
the exchange rate, presumably in the hope of 
establishing market stability. Within a year, when the 
objective was not being achieved, this policy was 
reversed. It was replaced by a strong commitment to 
liberalization of the exchange rate prices the removal of 
subsidies and credit restrictions. In this new 
environment the failure to contain credit had adverse 
consequences for the exchange rate, the rate of 
inflation, and ushered in a period of economic 
instability and speculation.
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Product grew on average by about 2.5 per cent 
for the period 1990-1992. The current deficit on the 
balance of payments contracted between 1990-1991 and 
achieved a small surplus in 1992. The external debt 
contracted by over 11 per cent between 1990-1992. 
Fiscal policy needed to take a more conservative stance 
in the lace of liberalization, the continuing debt burden 
and the need to make provision for Central Bank 
losses. If amortization costs were excluded, a surplus 
of 2.5 per cent of product was achieved in 1991 and 
this increased to the equivalent of 2.9 per cent in 1992. 
The accelerated process of liberalization and 
insufficient policy coordination, however, took its toll 
in diminished stability, inflation increasing 
progressively from just over 8 per cent in 1988 to over 
77 per cent in 1992.
State participation in the productive sectors 
was first mooted in the five-year Plan of 1963-1968. 
The period 1972-1980 saw redoubled efforts to increase 
State participation, the rationale being to stimulate 
growth and facilitate the redistribution of resultant 
benefits. Because of these developments the Jamaican 
Government had a portfolio of investments that had 
grown haphazardly up to 1981. It included activities in 
bauxite, petroleum, cement, 75 per cent of Jamaica’s 
sugar output and 50 percent of hotel room capacity. It 
also included activities in finance and a State Trading 
Company. Estimates of the quantum of such holdings 
vary. One is that State-owned enterprises numbered 
400 by 1980, though this number contracted to about 
200 by the end of the decade, consequent on closures 
and divestment. It has also been estimated that 
government participated in directly productive activities 
in 198 companies, 81 per cent of which were wholly 
owned.
A combination of ideological and practical 
reasons surrounded the introduction of privatization in
1981. A change of government stressed a greater role 
for the private sector but focus was placed on the fiscal 
imbalances and the need to service a growing debt. 
Given the impact of the major State-owned entities on 
the fiscal account their reform became a priority. With 
an eye to fiscal performance, reforms transformed the 
operating balance of these entities from a deficit of 1 
per cent of GDP in 1981 to a surplus of about 7 per 
cent of GDP by 1988. The emphasis was on making 
these entities profitable through cost recovery. Less 
concern was directed at efficiency. The focus instead 
was on reducing the backlog of investment but this had
the effect of increased the portion of government 
guaranteed debt attributable to them.
For the period 1985-1991, 39 of the 
enterprises listed were divested, as well as other 
properties being used for agricultural and other forms 
of development. Many mechanisms were used in the 
divestment process. These included leases, placements 
on the Stock Exchange, share sales for unlisted entities 
and offers of shares to employees, while some assets of 
other entities were sold before their closure.
Despite general support for privatization, some 
criticisms were voiced, so that phase two, in which 67 
entities were earmarked for privatization, was launched 
in the context of changed administrative arrangements 
and regulations enacted to ensure greater transparency. 
Phase two of the programme had divested 16 public 
sector entities, up to the end of 1992. This took the 
form of lease of assets; outright sale; sale of 
equipment, land or shares; or in one case, that of the 
former government printing office, the creation of an 
Employee Ownership Share Plan. The proceeds from 
these activities, amounted to J$ 1,062 million.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Trinidad and 
Tobago was riding on the crest of the oil boom, which 
began in 1973. The impact of the twin oil price 
windfalls, which provided strong positive impulses to 
government revenues and to the balance of payments, 
fuelled greatly increased government activity. This 
permitted the near doubling in the rate of growth of 
product, from 3.1 per cent per annum on average for 
the period 1965-1973, to 5.8 per cent per annum on 
average for the period 1973-1983.
The economy manifested two distinct phases 
over the decade. In the first phase, the aftermath of 
the second oil boom from 1980-1982, output increased 
by almost 20 per cent, based essentially on increased 
petroleum earnings and expansionary fiscal policies. 
Accordingly, the spending momentum, which got 
underway in 1980, accelerated, evidenced by the lact 
that government spending, which averaged about 32 per 
cent of product in the period 1979-1980, grew rapidly 
after that, being equivalent to one half of GDP by
1982. In that year current spending grew by 70 per 
cent, the rise being attributable mainly to increased 
public sector wages and salaries that grew by 119 per 
cent and transfers and subsidies that grew by 50 per 
cent. Within a year a fiscal surplus equivalent to 2.6
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per cent of GDP in 1981 was transformed into a deficit 
equivalent to 12 per cent of GDP in 1982. The current 
external surplus equivalent to over 5 per cent of 
product went into deficit equivalent to over 8 per cent 
of product. A rapid erosion of the reserves also began. 
This was not sustainable.
The second phase, from 1983 to the present, 
was one of a cumulative contraction of real product by 
33 per cent. In this phase fiscal policy was mixed, 
initially continuing the expansionary policies of the first 
phase but as this generated a rapid erosion of the 
reserves, adjustment measures became necessary and 
were initiated after 1983. Weak growth was achieved 
in 1991 but this was spurred by a slight recovery in 
petroleum prices and economic contraction was 
resumed for the period 1992-1993. Concealed within 
this summary was a fairly severe fiscal correction. Its 
extent was shown by the fact that government revenues 
averaged a fairly steady 35 per cent of GDP for the 
period 1973-1987. This fell subsequently to average
29.6 per cent between 1988-1992. The importance of 
the revenue decline needs also to be seen in the context 
of concomitant decline in real GDP. This would have 
been even greater had attempts not been made to 
compensate for significant declines in petroleum 
revenue, by increasing other forms of taxation.
During the period 1976-1985, expenditures 
grew fester than product, to peak in that year at 39 per 
cent of GDP. They fell subsequently to average about 
33 per cent for the period 1988-1992. For 1993 a small 
surplus was projected with income and expenditure at 
28 per cent of GDP. Wages to central government 
workers declined from a peak of 15 per cent of GDP 
in 1986 to just over 10 per cent in 1993. In the case of 
expenditures there was evidence of much effort to 
adjust to the contracting economy. Yet the burden of 
adjustment was put on capital spending. On average for 
the period 1989-1992, recurrent expenditures accounted 
for over 90 per cent of all expenditures. In 1993 it was 
over 94 per cent, which means that less than 6 per cent 
of product was available to reorient the economy and 
facilitate economic activity or provide new directions in 
human resources development.
The period under review witnessed severe 
economic contraction, product felling by one third 
between 1983-1993. Unemployment rose from about 10 
per cent in 1982 to peak at 22 per cent in 1989, felling 
to 20 per cent in 1992. Pressure in the external account 
required progressive devaluation of the currency, the
rate moving from TT$ 2.4 to the United States dollar 
to TT$5.6 just after it was transferred to a floating 
regime. The level of economic contraction also 
severely weakened the financial system, which was 
required to adjust to greater credit risks caused by 
increased bankruptcies and depressed real estate prices. 
It also required a major restructuring of the sector. 
Improved surveillance by the central authorities was 
necessary and new measures were put into place to 
bolster financial institutions.
The State became widely involved in directly 
productive activity, following from policies enunciated 
in its third Five-Year Plan (1969-1973). This said that 
the State would take a heightened role in development, 
to create new job opportunities, to transform the 
economy and ensure overall national development. 
These objectives remained dormant until 1973, since 
the State lacked the resources to effect them. In 1972 
the government had share holdings in 32 companies, 
with a book value of approximately TT$ 60 million.
The size and scope of government activity 
grew rapidly after that, bolstered by the resources 
available from the oil price windfalls. By the end of 
1986, the State held a portfolio of 166 enterprises with 
its share holdings valued at over TT$3953 million. This 
portfolio covered such activities as oil, gas, petro­
chemicals, asphalt, airlines, hotels, banking, insurance, 
sugar, mixed farming, fruit and meat processing, grain 
milling, maintenance and so on. Of these, many of 
which competed directly with the private sector, 37 
were wholly owned, 11 were majority owned, one was 
50 per cent owned, and seventeen were minority 
holdings. At its peak in 1985, these enterprises 
employed over 34,000 people. Overall, the public 
sector absorbed on average 47 per cent of all salaried 
employees over the period 1989-1991.
The involvement of the State was fer laiger 
than the nominal value of the holdings would suggest. 
Loans, advances and subventions were readily made 
available to public enterprises and it is estimated that 
such assistance amounted to TT$5,800 million between 
1979-1984. In 1987 alone TT$ 967 million, or almost 
20 per cent of recurrent expenditure, was budgeted to 
cover operating debts and contingent liabilities relating 
to the State enterprises. Many were dependent on such 
support for their continued existence. Government 
transfers, mainly to public enterprises and public 
utilities, amounted to almost 10 per cent of GDP in
1991. The large State enterprises had also contributed
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a large portion of the external debt, accounting for 
about 65 per cent of it in 1987. Based on the 
experience of existing public enterprises and the 
prevailing economic situation, the government decided 
to reduce the dominant role that the State had played in 
the economy between 1974 and 1986. While these 
policies were implicitly followed after 1986, they were 
made explicit in the Macro Planning Framework 1989- 
1995.
It was proposed that all holdings in which the 
government had a minority share should be divested. 
Recommendations were made regarding 20 enterprises. 
Twelve were recommended for divestment, six for 
liquidation, and in one case no action was to be taken.
By the end of 1991 four firms were liquidated, one 
was leased and five were divested. The proceeds from 
these divestments amounted to US$6.8 million from 
public sale and US$84.9 from private sale to 
foreigners. Proceeds were used to retire public debt.
With the arrival o f a new administration there 
was a hiatus in the divestment process and a review of 
existing policies completed by the first quarter of 1993. 
Then 84 government companies were examined, with 
firm decisions made concerning 47 of them. The 
remaining 37 were still under review. Of the 47, it was 
decided to divest 28 of them, 11 were in various stages 
of liquidation and four of the remaining eight were to 
be restructured, the rest to remain in the public sector.
Conclusions
Structural adjustment
The adjustment process was not smooth for 
any of the countries surveyed. Nor is it complete, 
although in Jamaica it has been going for at least two 
decades. Management of the economy needs to be seen 
as a process of continuous adaptation to changing 
circumstances, so in a sense adjustment is never 
complete. Nevertheless, always there was a perceptible 
lag between the appearance of disequilibrium and a 
decision to act and when action was taken the process 
was untidy, often fraught with experimentation, policy 
reversals and sometimes errors of judgement. Not 
surprisingly, the process of attaining basic economic 
balance was prolonged and policies needed to reactivate 
newly and existing productive capacities were slow in 
forthcoming. The four case studies raise several issues 
that might shed light on the reasons for the protracted 
adjustment.
Time was lost in making structural changes 
because policy makers often misjudged the nature of 
the disequilibrium. In the early 1970s, negative shocks 
affecting the economies were treated as temporary, so 
that instead of adjusting to them fiscal measures were 
used to cushion consumers and defer adjustment. As 
the shocks persisted, adjustment eventually had to be 
applied but in the worsened economic state of a 
burdensome debt. Conversely, when windfalls arrived 
they were often treated as permanent, eliciting
increased capacities or services that were permanently 
dependent upon them. Severe political difficulties and 
economic dislocations were subsequently experienced 
when the windfall ceased and the services could not be 
sustained1.
Adjustment was also delayed in many instances 
by policy inconsistency. In none of the countries 
surveyed was there a consistent pattern of economic 
management in place to confront the adjustment 
problem. The prevailing paradigm manifested inherent 
elements of unsustainability, which may have led to or 
exacerbated disequilibrium. During the transition to 
new policy inconsistencies remained and might often 
have been increased as new ideas were accepted and 
applied piecemeal.
Initially, the dominant paradigm was State 
driven, inward-looking and market averse. It was based 
on the principle o f public sector command and control. 
A plethora of regulations was created to circumscribe 
private action. Many of them were defensive, created 
on the spur of the moment to satisfy particular needs 
and had scant regard for their side-effects on the 
economy as a whole. Layers of regulations, often 
created distortions and sent inconsistent signals to 
economic actors, whether these were consumers or
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producers. Confusion often encouraged risk averse 
behaviour.
Decision-making was centralized, demanding 
near-perfect information and timing for response from 
a few at the centre. Not surprisingly, errors of 
judgement made by these few affected the public as a 
whole. Difficult decisions were sometimes postponed or 
deflected because of lack of information or because of 
the political consequences. Often, regulations designed 
to control private actors, were bypassed by them, so 
that whole areas of policy operated under a fiction with 
decisions being made on the assumption of compliance, 
while significant areas of the economy went 
underground.
The change of the paradigm, to give greater 
emphasis to prices and the market, concomitantly also 
removed major areas from public sector control. 
Competing views of the role of the State thus 
engendered, needed to play themselves out before 
consistent and coherent policies could be formulated. 
The public sector itself, not surprisingly, became a 
major defender of State power, although its position 
was not unified since the new paradigm to divest State 
power was in part ushered in by elements of the 
selfsame public sector. The debate tended to polarize 
the society.
Further polarization followed the intervention 
of the International Financial Institutions. Since IFI 
policy conditions were known to conflict with the 
prevailing paradigm, the tendency was to delay 
recourse to them to the last possible moment. Once 
they were asked to provide adjustment finance, 
conditions were applied to ensure the curtailment of 
disequilibrium and the future repayment of loans. 
Delay, however, meant that economic performance had 
usually deteriorated to a situation where drastic and 
uigent corrective action was needed. Such actions were 
often politically unpopular.
Introduction of the IFI, into the policy 
process, spawned two further elements into the political 
arena. The first was to blame the IFI for unpopular 
policies. The second was to play the nationalist card, 
i.e ., to try to prevent foreign influences from 
intervening in the formation of national policies. Both 
elements had the effect of distancing some political 
elites from the adjustment exercise, factors that created 
further policy uncertainty. This manifested itself even 
within the ruling parties. It also emboldened the
opposition to distance itself from current practice, 
causing discontinuity after a change of government. 
After a period of familiarization, the new regime 
usually had to initiate an embarrassing policy reversal, 
further eroding confidence and delaying the process.
IFI policies might also have suffered from 
insufficient fine-tuning to national circumstances, in 
areas such as timing and in the selection of the policy 
mix. This is different from the popular criticism that 
unique policies were needed for the unique economies 
of the Caribbean. The intervention of the IFI was 
intended to speed up the process of adjustment, and 
they could not be accused of being indifferent to the 
importance of time. Nevertheless, the intrusion of 
further political elements into the debate tended also to 
heighten the degree of contention and slow the process 
of change.
Gradualist policies were often advocated by 
governments, in the spirit of cushioning the shock of 
adjustment, because of policy uncertainty or as a 
rearguard action where IFI financing was needed but 
conditionalities were opposed. Gradualism took the 
form of negotiating longer deadlines for the 
achievement of targets, the postponement of new 
policies, or simply non-compliance with targets. 
Gradualism was often counter productive in extending 
the period before corrective measures were carried out. 
Since the costs of adjustment were likely to be felt long 
before the benefits, gradualism, by postponing the 
arrival of benefits was likely to induce adjustment 
fatigue and to discredit the process as a whole.
Adjustment was further hampered by a lack of 
articulation between short and medium-term policies, 
since business decisions were dependent upon a 
coherent combination of the two. Initially, the focus 
was on achieving short-term balances through the 
annual budget and coping with the huge debt burden. 
Because of the reasons outlined above, balance was not 
achieved in the short term. Meanwhile, scant regard 
was given to the longer-term policy framework.
New investment, either local or foreign, was 
delayed by the lack of coherence between policies. One 
policy objective was that the dominant role of 
government in driving the economy had to contract, to 
regain fiscal balance and to release resources for 
investment by private actors. This has been long in 
coming, not least because of the need to use surpluses 
to meet the debt burden. However, even where
resources were available, investment was tardy since 
many disincentives to private actors remained in place. 
The contentious nature of some of these new policies 
took long to carry out and at various times seemed far 
from certain. Private investors were, therefore, imbued 
with caution and needed to be convinced that policies 
would not be easily reversible. Confidence was not 
easily achieved since parties in opposition invariably 
opposed the adjustment policies, some going as far as 
to promise reversals. New investment was therefore 
slow in surfacing and the spiral of steadily contracting 
economic activity difficult to break.
Existing productive capacity needed also to be 
retooled where possible to make it viable outside the 
protective walls of the integrated market. Exchange 
rate and trade policies were major tools in the quest 
for export competitiveness. The former, a tool having 
immediate short-term impact was applied erratically, 
since it usually had adverse political consequences. 
Typically parity changes were delayed long after they 
became necessary so that in a scenario of high 
inflation, competitiveness was often fleeting. Yet, 
where parities changed, the impact on existing 
enterprises was not always positive since enterprises 
had been spawned and developed in an environment of 
over-valued rates thus being dependent upon imported 
inputs. Parity changes required that these inputs be 
substituted locally if  financial health was to be 
maintained. Often this was not possible. Similar 
impacts were felt by the reduction of protection, since 
reduced tariffs exposed them to greater external 
competition. The adjustment process was, therefore, 
complicated by the fact that adjustment was also 
needed in the structure and operations of existing 
private operations. This adjustment needed to take 
place in fiercely competitive and more recently, in 
contracting global markets.
Domestic adjustment policies were often 
inconsistent with regional arrangements. CARICOM 
was, initially, more compatible with a regime based on 
command and control. Such a regime could, in theory, 
better deal with harmonized regional policies, in trade, 
production, exchange rates, and so on. In practice,
however, even where the tools existed and agreements 
were formally reached to use them, they were often not 
applied. Sometimes, when they were applied, policies 
were difficult to enforce. Commonly where decisions 
were made by small elite groups, application was 
hampered because they did not have sufficient public 
support.
The paradigm shift taking place at the national 
level in some countries was, however, also being 
replicated in regional policy, though unevenly and with 
a lag. As a result, those countries that had advanced 
furthest with the adjustment process were often most 
instrumental in seeking reforms at the regional level. 
Where exchange rates were out of line, unilateral 
changes created tensions within the movement shifting 
the balance of trade and engendering threats of 
retaliation. Even further tensions were created where 
policies shifted from fixed to floating regimes. Those 
countries moving fastest to increase export 
competitiveness became conscious of the anti-export 
bias conferred by high rates of effective protection, 
thus pushing for tariff reform. Conversely, those not 
adjusting needed protection to survive. Divided 
loyalties further complicated policy-making so that if  
regional and national policies were to be made 
compatible it meant that both would need to change 
together. This was even more difficult to achieve than 
national consensus. It also implied that the integration 
model that finally appeared would differ significantly 
from that initially conceived.
Simultaneously, the regional experience with 
disequilibrium and the adjustment process also induced 
some to advocate regional institutions to solve them. 
Examples are for a regional central bank and common 
currency. It was felt that a multi-country approach 
would constrain national fiscal and monetary policy to 
be less capricious than it had been in the past. On 
balance the regional integration initiative acted to slow 
the process of adjustment. While a regional trade 
regime need not be inherently opposed to outward 
trading policies and a market orientation, the one 
originally conceived for CARICOM still needs 
adaptation to these objectives.
Privatization
None of the case studies could discuss all of collectively2, to illustrate many issues necessary to
the issues raised by privatization in any of the countries arrive at some general conclusions,
studied. Nevertheless, they have managed,
Always, the public debate on privatization was 
vigorous and sometimes it was acrimonious. All the 
cases showed a common morphology that began with 
the issue of whether to privatize, then went on to 
examine what to privatize and finally to the stage of 
considering how best to privatize. The lags between 
these stages varied from country to country, depending 
upon several national characteristics. They included the 
coalitions of interest for or against privatization, public 
management of the issue, the administrative capabilities 
to manage public enterprises, and so on. It might be 
useful to explore each of these stages in greater detail.
Privatization and public attitudes
The issue of whether to privatize arose from 
several sources. One was emulation of policies toward 
public entities abroad, which were being deregulated 
and privatized, in some cases after being dismantled 
and their component parts treated separately. This 
technique was also being practised in the private sector 
as a means to create more manageable, specialized and 
supposedly more efficient entities. A second source of 
influence was undoubtedly the international financial 
institutions. They were motivated in part by current 
practise, in part by comparative cross-country analysis, 
in part by the twin imperatives of establishing fiscal 
balance and increased efficiency and competitiveness. 
Many of these views surfaced as integral parts of 
adjustment programmes that they financed. Yet while 
much opposition to privatization was generated locally, 
the impetus for it did not come solely from outside.
Often, the political leadership and senior civil 
servants, especially those that were responsible for 
macro-policy, became advocates of it. For the public 
sector enterprises had become a two-edged sword. 
While the political elites were sometimes the 
beneficiaries of clientielism, they were increasingly 
becoming the victims of it, as the demand for favours 
outstripped the capacity of already overmanned and 
sometimes insolvent institutions to supply them.
Increasingly, as the public sector enterprises 
foiled to deliver even the necessary basic services for 
which they were created and as they increased the tax 
burden on the great silent majority, fer from being 
assets they became political liabilities. Moreover, in the 
fece of a general economic malaise and the recognition 
that international competitiveness was declining, the 
inefficiencies of the public sector enterprises revealed 
themselves as an intractable3 obstacle to general macro
economic correction. Moreover, the policy attention 
necessary to micro-manage them was not available to 
political directorates in the fece of more pressing 
issues. Finally, the continuation of a hands-off policy, 
if  initiated by the party in power, could not be assured 
in case of a change of government. Accordingly, the 
total removal of a public enterprise from the political 
arena held attractions to those in power.
The opposition to privatization, nevertheless, 
came essentially from domestic sources, the public 
sector elites, often at the sectoral level, in alliance with 
the trade unions, the opposition party(ies) and a large 
part of the intellectual community. Public choice 
theory4 illuminates the motives of many public sector 
elites. It suggests that public bureaucracies tend to 
expand and to perpetuate themselves. Control over 
public enterprises was a source of responsibility and 
power. Delegation of responsibility to private actors 
reduced power, control and the basis for survival of the 
bureaucracy. Since the bureaucracy was already under 
threat, for the self same reasons as the public 
enterprise, those of fiscal balance and lack of effective 
delivery, their anxiety at the loss of power and even 
employment was understandable.
Public enterprise employees and their unions 
and other trade unions allied to them, were also 
motivated to oppose privatization, essentially because 
it entailed the adoption of a new and alien 
organizational culture. Risk was enormously increased 
at the corporate and individual levels. In the context of 
severe over manning, public enterprise employees 
feared job losses consistent with those taking place in 
the private sector as macro policy forced it to become 
more internationally competitive. Public enterprise 
employees also feared a new management style that 
would be less amenable to political influence and to the 
retention of perquisites that might not be customary in 
the private sector. The trades union movement itself, in 
the fece of consistent failure to retard the pace of 
restructuring and labour dislocation in the private 
sector, was feeing a threat to its very credibility. For 
them, privatization threatened more of the same, except 
that the will to fight was increased since the political 
directorate often presented what was perceived to be a 
more responsive target.
Opposition parties opposed privatization for a 
variety of reasons. The first was to be expected in the 
normal thrust and parry of the political process, as the 
opposition sought new alliances with those disenchanted
by current policy. Secondly, they feared the removal of 
possible future sources of patronage from their grasp 
and while in opposition, unlike incumbents, had no 
countervailing responsibility for effective current 
economic performance. Finally, since they lacked 
control of the process, they were unable to control the 
benefits accruing from privatization and feared the 
motives of those who had such control. So, even where 
an opposition party had no inherent objection to 
privatization, delay was prudent until better control of 
the process and concomitant use of the proceeds could 
be secured.
The intellectual community tended largely to 
oppose privatization, although this was not universally 
so. Issues of equity, political and national control and 
power predominated. The capacity of the State to 
practice price discrimination was cited as a major tool 
for effecting transfers to the neediest. These transfers 
took place in the provision of electricity, water, and 
basic foodstuffs, especially where flour, cooking oil, 
sugar and other staples were produced by State 
monopolies. Overmanning in one context might also be 
perceived as a valid attempt at job creation in another. 
Unemployment was also a source of concern, based on 
the experience of other countries undertaking similar 
policies. The focus of State enterprises toward social 
objectives, instead of simply on private profit, provided 
a further reason for supporting the former, especially 
in areas such as health and education. A more rigorous 
form of localization formed yet another reason for 
supporting State enterprises, since privatization might 
open activities to non-nationals, but even if  it did not, 
means were not available to tie private capital 
exclusively to national development. Finally, some 
intellectuals might harbour similar motives to those 
held by opposition politicians, since the career path of 
the intellectual led more often to the political arena 
than into private enterprise.
The domestic private sector was expected to 
support privatization, although this support was not 
readily translated into action. Some private sector 
interests opposed liberalization, especially where 
regulated markets stifled competition and permitted 
them to earn super normal profits. Deregulation and the 
need for industrial restructuring, often left them with a 
dearth of resources available to invest in new 
enterprises, especially given the financial and 
oiganizational predicament of the public enterprises. 
Severe problems were anticipated to deal with 
overstaffing, a policy defended by militant unions,
while some enterprises were technically insolvent. In 
monopolies, regulatory frameworks were often not in 
place, they were opaque, or they were deemed by 
putative investors to be subject to excessive political 
control.
The groups arrayed against privatization, 
therefore, made it more likely that public advocacy 
would be predominantly against it, while many of those 
in support were either politically silent or ambivalent as 
far as action was concerned. Even i f  initially the mood 
was to reject privatization, the unsustainability of 
current practice, especially as this impinged on the 
fiscal budget, required that some action be taken to 
improve the performance of the public enterprises, 
whether they were ultimately to be privatizied or not.
Such actions often included deregulation at the 
level of the wider economy, including price decontrol. 
It also included the reduction of trade barriers to 
increase the exposure to foreign competition, necessary 
to improve the functioning of the market especially in 
small countries. Other measures included deregulation 
of foreign exchange markets and interest rates, so 
removing the privileged position of State enterprises.
Better management, sometimes obtained by 
outside specialists, the end of transfers from the public 
purse and the requirement of early profitability, all 
tended to shift the internal operations of the enterprise 
closer to those obtaining in the private sector. 
Sometimes the firms needed an audit to figure out their 
assets. In most this was followed by organizational 
restructuring to reduce and retrain the staff 
complement. Sometimes financial restructuring was 
also needed, where attention had to be paid to 
outstanding debt, while in a few new investments were 
needed in equipment and improved technology. In this 
process, the constellations of interests ranged for or 
against privatization often began to shift.
Once public enterprises begin to operate more 
like private entities the fears of employees begin to 
recede. As they become more viable, employment and 
remuneration could expand and the conditions of 
service, including on-the-job training and morale 
improved. Solvent well-run entities also become more 
attractive to private investors. Simultaneously 
divestment became more attractive to the political 
directorate. Cross subsidies usually ceased, so that 
expectations of political benefit receded. Outright sale 
became attractive to incumbent politicians since the
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proceeds could be used to retire debt or to improve 
social infrastructure. In this context, the debate began 
to shift, to consider which enterprises justified 
privatization and how best it could be achieved.
Selecting appropriate entities for privatization
In the determination of what to privatize, 
three key conceptual hurdles need to be crossed. The 
first relates to natural monopolies, prompting 
discussion on the distinction between ownership and 
control. Here consideration needs to be given to the 
mechanisms that are possible and workable to regulate 
monopolies, whether public or private. In either case 
representatives of the public and private sectors, 
workers and consumers are likely to be involved in the 
regulatory process. A further issue is whether, even 
with the appropriate institutional relationships, the 
monopoly can be controlled. Alternatively, public 
discussion might help in identifying the limit to the 
number of public enterprises that a small State can 
effectively control. Out of these discussions the issue of 
who owns the monopoly, might become a secondary 
issue to how effective control can be secured over it.
The second major issue relates to concern for 
the welfare o f the neediest. This issue could stimulate 
discussion to identify the neediest individuals to whom 
transfers need to be made and the various alternatives 
available for making them. Here the discussion might 
focus on whether transfers need to be direct and in kind 
from the public enterprise. Or whether they might be 
better targeted indirectly, for example, as income 
transfers or coupons for the procurement of specific 
goods or services.
The third major issue relates to the allocation 
of benefits from privatization. Who benefits from the 
proceeds of the sale and has access to the assets to be 
sold. In the first case does the government use the 
income from divestment to meet recurrent expenditure, 
in which case imbalance is simply disguised, or does it 
use the proceeds to reduce debt or improve social or 
physical infrastructure. What is a fair price and how is 
it decided? Some discussion needs to focus on the 
paradox of privatization where governments wish to 
sell sometimes unattractive operations. Market values 
are often hard to determine, but in appropriate cases 
open bidding is usually acceptable. In larger utilities 
this method might not be feasible, although it might be
possible to break the utility into manageable 
components and use the bidding procedure for these 
smaller parts. Safeguards will be necessary always to 
ensure that public probity is maintained. Does 
privatization contribute to the concentration of 
ownership or does it serve to broaden it, both as 
between classes and between ethnic groups?5 Where 
these social concerns militate against efficiency, trade­
offs need to be made explicit so that the public can 
ponder the opportunity cost of the resources involved.
Other issues are likely to generate less 
controversy. These include whether the objective of the 
enterprise has been achieved or can be achieved, 
whether the circumstances justifying public ownership 
have changed, for example, whether the sector in 
which the public enterprise operates remains strategic 
or especially depressed.
The discussion of these issues will provide 
pointers about what might be privatized and how the 
privatization might best be effected at any given time. 
Since the discussion is likely to be protracted, 
perceptions are likely to change during the debate, 
experience showing that as familiarity with privatization 
grows areas and means, hitherto taboo, might become 
acceptable6.
Choosing appropriate methods for privatization
The organizational arrangements necessary 
to effect the process of privatization needs to be 
considered once the set of entities to be privatized have 
been decided. Arguments tend to favour a centralized 
approach. These say that a strong well-led central 
authority is needed to develop the momentum against 
vested interests for the status quo. It is also argued that 
only a central body can develop the expertise needed to 
ensure that privatization can take place under the best 
terms. Finally, it is suggested that greater transparency 
and better control and monitoring of the process is 
possible with one responsible agency. Conversely, it 
may be argued that one agency might become 
overloaded with the task, creating organizational and 
bureaucratic bottlenecks that could slow the process. In 
such cases it might be possible to identify a focal point, 
with clear mandate and leadership at a sufficiently high 
political level, to define the policies and to monitor the 
process. The responsibility for implementation might be 
delegated.
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The issues to be considered by the appropriate 
focal point would include the following: 1) the extent 
and the pace of privatization; 2) public information 
policies, with emphasis on the issue of transparency; 3) 
the selection of entities to be privatized, evaluation in 
each case of the reason for privatization and 
determination of the most appropriate methods; 4) 
identification of the necessary prior action, at the level 
of the macro economy and within the chosen firms; 5) 
the sequencing of sales; 6) preparation of the 
appropriate legal framework, where necessary, i.e., 
new laws may be needed to abolish a monopoly, 
strengthen private property rights, provide effective 
legal enforcement or measures for dispute settlement, 
and so on; 7) consideration of support measures, which 
might condition the method of privatization to be used, 
in the effect of adverse social impacts, and make the 
necessary trade-offs where these conflict with 
enterprise efficiency or selling price; and, 8) valuation 
of the enterprise and the modalities that might be used 
in financing its sale.
In Jamaica, experience gained over time led 
to formal centralization of the privatization process in 
the NIBJ, operating under the aegis of the Office of the 
Prime Minister. Nevertheless, privatization continued 
to be conducted by other government agencies. 
Proposals submitted by the UNDP to the government 
of the Dominican Republic also favoured a single 
agency, the Restructuring and Transfer Office, under 
the aegis of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. It 
was argued that since the initiative would play a 
catalytic role in reform of the business regulatory 
environment, the banking sector and the nascent 
securities market, it was best located in the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce. In Guyana, the entity 
responsible for privatization comprised an inter­
ministerial policy body and an executing committee. 
Assistance was received from consultants in valuing the 
entities to be privatized and in preparing them for 
privatization. The previous arrangements are currently 
being reviewed.
A full range of options has been used in 
transferring public entities. These include direct sale 
either outright or in partnership; private placements to 
selected investors in the field; public share offerings; 
auctions; sales to employees; liquidation; leasing, 
management contracts or operating concessions, 
sometimes in combination, sometimes before sale.
The means chosen for transfer will be 
influenced by the overriding policy of the State, for 
divestment with fewest links will be preferable where 
a new hands-off role for the State is envisaged. Where 
the motivations are more pragmatic, joint ventures and 
management contracts that retain some involvement 
will be more acceptable. Other concerns of the State 
might be speed of transfer, fiscal concerns and 
improving the quality of the market - all factors that 
could influence the means of transfer. Means of 
transfer will also be conditioned by the objective 
circumstances of the enterprise, public share offerings 
where the enterprise is large and profitable, liquidation 
and sale of assets where it is not solvent. Finally, the 
means of sale will be conditioned by socio-political 
considerations. For example, where management or 
workers oppose privatization, the disposal o f shares, in 
whole or in part, to workers or managers might be a 
viable means of divestment. Similarly, where an issue 
such as widening participation in business activity is a 
goal some shares might be reserved for selected groups 
of small investors.
The sources of finance for privatization vary. 
Domestic capital is the most obvious source. At the 
macroeconomic level some credit needs to be available 
at reasonable rates so that domestic investors can 
acquire the assets put up for privatization. As the 
privatization initiative often takes place with economic 
stabilization this condition might not be easily achieved. 
Other means might be necessary to ease the transfer, 
such as management buy-out or buy-in schemes, with 
special credit schemes or arrangements to spread the 
transfer over time, from partial to total privatization. 
Similarly, the transfer might begin with a management 
contract, with the provision of a purchase option, 
linked to profitability or increase in value of the firm. 
Debt-equity swaps are another source of finance for 
privatization.
Foreign capital is a further source of 
financing, which often brings with it improved 
technology, management and marketing skills. The 
former is particularly relevant in telecommunications, 
the latter in areas such as privatized airlines while 
management is a commodity hard to find in most public 
enterprises. Foreign investment, however, is unlikely 
to come, for this or any other reason, without a stable 
macroeconomic environment that has achieved a fair 
measure of deregulation. Since privatization is one
policy measure being used in a larger package to 
achieve such an environment, capital inflows have not 
been as forthcoming in the early stages of the process 
as was hoped by some. Conversely, the sale of national 
assets is sometimes so controversial that policy makers 
are often loath to complicate the matter further with the 
issue of foreign ownership.
In general, it seems desirable to have an inter­
ministerial group responsible for privatization policy 
and for overseeing the process. A privatization unit 
comprising public officials should be responsible for 
executing policy. Where appropriate expertise is not 
available to prepare entities for privatization this 
expertise should be contracted.
The privatization process should seek to 
maximize the proceeds from the sale of assets to be 
privatized, due attention being paid to the pace of 
divestment. This argues against an unduly protracted 
period of preparation before privatization. It also 
argues against special preferences being granted to 
either workers or managers of the firms to be 
privatized.
Special efforts should be made to ensure 
transparency in privatization transactions. Financial and 
operational information on all entities to be privatized 
should be widely disseminated so that all interested 
parties have equal access to it. Sales should also be 
widely publicised, wherever possible by public auction. 
Where sealed bids are necessary they should be opened 
publicly. Finally, fair compensation should be paid and 
retraining provided in those cases where employees 
lose their jobs because of privatization.
Special considerations apply in the treatment 
of natural monopolies such as electricity, water and 
telecommunications. As has been mentioned previously, 
effective regulation to monitor the quality and price of 
the product is necessary whether monopolies are in the 
public or private domain. Under these circumstances 
one might be indifferent to ownership, except where 
necessary investments are sufficiently large that they 
create a burden for a small State. Or where access to 
new and fast-moving technology is necessary for the 
effective development of the enterprise and indeed the 
country itself. This is currently deemed to be the case 
with telecommunications. Here a joint venture or sale 
to a foreign partner is the norm. In the former case, 
where the size of investment is great, a situation that
often obtains with the electricity utility, a range of 
options is available and is being evaluated in the 
region.
In all the cases examined, electrical utilities 
were being considered for privatization, with several 
options being considered. These include: a)
subcontracting some functions to private firms, such as 
the maintenance of generating plants, or power lines, 
control of inventories, or maintenance and management 
of transport fleets; b) forming joint ventures with 
specialized companies to operate the companies in 
whole or various parts of it; c) reducing or eliminating 
government’s share by bond offers or venture capital to 
private investors; d) outright privatization as a single 
going entity; e) where appropriate, dividing the utility 
into folly or partially integrated regional entities; and 
f) separating transmission from generation and 
distribution functions, with the former to remain under 
public ownership and the latter functions might be 
privatized.
It should be noted that breaking down many 
component parts of a monopoly can increase its 
exposure to competition. Where, for example, most 
independent private power stations vie for connection 
to the national grid, an element of competition can be 
introduced. Similarly, many other functions within the 
power sector can be defined and disaggregated and put 
to public tender, bringing a further element of 
competition.
Although the public perception might not yet 
be ready for it, similar arguments might be extended 
and the means found to improve the services provided 
in areas such as education or health. Currently concern 
is being expressed about the quality and availability of 
services in both these sectors and governments find it 
almost impossible to provide increased funding for 
them. More efficient ways of using current fonds 
would meet with universal approval.
Essentially the issue is one of creating and 
maintaining an effective regulatory framework. This 
would define the quality of the product, the curriculum 
in education, or a set o f fixed services in health. It 
would also set a scale of appropriate charges, 
consumers being given freedom to obtain the service 
from a provider of their choice. Whether that provider 
is public or private might become secondary, once the 
consumer was satisfied that quality, price and other 
issues such as equity, were satisfied.
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The public sector enterprises came about in the 
quest for better, more equitable and more efficient 
services. Much has been achieved by them, though the 
public is now demanding more, as the quality of these 
services seems insufficient to meet the challenges of the 
future. Simultaneously, the role of the State is being 
reconsidered, to shift it away from general diffuse
responsibilities, to concentrate on areas where its 
participation is unique and irreplaceable. Enterprise 
management is not deemed to be one of these. 
Conversely, it is a private sector specialization. New 
ways need to be explored to ensure better performance 
at all levels o f the society. Privatization is one means 
being explored in an effort to achieve this objective.
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THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
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The oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979-1981 
provide significant clues to any understanding of the 
turbulent years of the 1970s and the complex task of 
adjustment faced by many developing countries in the 
1980s. For the oil shocks provided the catalyst which 
accelerated the pace of development of a number of 
technological factors which had unobtrusively been 
coming to fruition in the 1960s and were on the verge 
of becoming operational. These developments which 
were to change factor proportions and competitive
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advantage in revolutionary ways, would have proceeded 
smoothly in the natural course of events, had all other 
factors remained on their expected trajectories. The 
fivefold increase in petroleum prices in 1973 provided 
a significant discontinuity with past events. It managed 
almost overnight to transfer an enormous block of 
resources from the major petroleum consuming 
countries, both developing and developed, to the major 
producers. Among the oil dependent developed and 
developing
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countries alike, the oil price increases changed relative 
competitive positions to favour those having lesser 
dependence on oil for energy and a product mix less 
intense in energy per unit of output.
Perceptions and, therefore, the policy 
responses to the oil price rise were also important, 
those countries possessing political leverage seeing it as 
short term and amenable to political pressure. Much 
effort was therefore expended by some countries, both 
developed and developing, in their varying ways, to 
mitigate the impacts of the oil price rise on their 
economies. The developed countries sought to exert 
political pressure to secure price reductions and later 
special trading arrangements to recycle oil surpluses. 
The developing ones sought to establish political 
alliances, either globally through the non-aligned 
movement, or regionally by virtue of trade, ideological 
or religious ties to secure guaranteed supplies, special 
oil credits and other increased capital flows to finance 
deficits. The common result was that in both these sets 
of countries the short-term macroeconomic balances 
were neglected and longer-term fundamental 
restructuring took a second order of priority to political 
activities.
For those countries having high petroleum 
dependence yet weak prospects of political leverage, 
the short-term prospects seemed dim and they set in 
train frenzied efforts to adjust to the changed factor 
costs. Domestic energy prices were rapidly increased 
to reflect the new global prices, after a short period of 
rationing in some cases, in an effort to conserve on its 
use and minimize its balance of payments impact and
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scant efforts were made to mitigate the impacts on 
consumer spending through increased public 
expenditure. For many successful firms, prices which 
were passed through shocked them out of the 
customary habits and provided the justification for new 
and unfamiliar modes of action.
The output mix of many of these firms 
changed to reduce the dependence upon natural raw 
materials and high energy inputs, while the modes of 
production also changed to emphasize high efficiency. 
Energy which was considered by some to be the crucial 
factor of production, especially after the price increase, 
was about to be supplanted by information. The oil 
price shocks provided the midwife for the birth of the 
information revolution, since information became the 
crucial ingredient to facilitate the new level of 
efficiency needed to compensate for their energy 
deficiency.
Information became the substitute for energy 
as it helped to conserve it both in energy using 
consumption goods as well as in production processes. 
It was also used to conserve upon labour as fewer 
people were used for greater output, by virtue of smart 
machines and robotics. More efficient use of people 
was also possible by the removal of many middle 
layers of management formerly used simply to 
coordinate and disseminate information within the 
productive process. Similarly middle-men operating as 
intermediaries between producers and consumers were 
about to be made redundant as consumers gained the 
information to access producers directly.
Information was used to conserve upon capital 
through more efficient use of it, through fester transfer 
and placement of it and through smaller inventories 
made possible by greater information about the 
frequency and composition of sales. Because of the 
significance of information it fostered the development 
of the fastest and most strategic industry of all, the 
microprocessors used for the purpose of applying 
information to society. In this race the greatest users of 
information had a competitive edge in knowing what 
was needed and how to produce it so that they were 
able initially to comer the market for microprocessors. 
Far from conferring a long-term disadvantage for some 
of the energy-dependent developed countries, the oil 
price shock therefore forced them to adapt fester and 
earlier to the realities of the later 1980s and early 
1990s than those less dependent and with greater 
political leverage. This became more evident with the 
second price shock of 1979-1981 and the consequent 
recession in the early 1980s, where the newly efficient 
producers were able to secure increased market shares 
from their erstwhile superiors and further increase them 
once global trade increased in the late 1980s.
This change in relative economic power set in 
train a high degree of instability in the 1980s as new 
economic actors came to the fore changing the 
traditional trading relations, affecting external payments 
patterns, exchange rates, investment flows and creating 
a new round of frictions predicated upon changed 
economic power. Despite this turbulence, global output 
was sustained at a respectable rate throughout the 
decade, with the developing countries as a whole 
sustaining a somewhat higher rate of output growth 
than the industrialised countries. This growth 
performance was supported by feirly steady growth in 
world trade volumes, despite feirly wild shifts in the 
unit values of trade. The traditional trading alliances 
and economic institutions are nevertheless beginning to 
experience some stress in the fece of the changing 
economic landscape.
Some of these stresses were particularly acute 
in the developing countries, especially those dependent 
upon minerals exports and imported energy, and those 
which had attempted to finance the deficits in the early
to mid 1970s with cheap recycled oil surpluses. They 
had to fece the second oil shock between 1979 - 1982 
having accumulated large debts, greatly increased debt 
servicing burdens, as a consequence o f rapidly rising 
interest rates. They also suffered from reduced demand 
for their raw materials exports. The minerals exporters 
felt the effects of the debt crisis early, to be followed 
soon after by the oil exporters, as oil prices declined 
steadily with the global economy and demand for it. 
For the petroleum exporters, greatly expanded 
consumption patterns and increased public investments 
in the boom years could not be reduced in the short 
term, so that reserves were depleted and debts 
increased.
These factors manifested themselves in the 
growth performance of the various developing country 
groupings over the decade of the 1980s. Those 
countries which had developed the capability and 
specialised in the export of manufactures had a 
sustained good growth performance throughout the 
decade. Annual per capita product grew on average by 
3.2 per cent, although performance declined towards 
the end or the decade as the global economy contracted 
(Figure 5).
The fuel exporting countries had a steady 
decline in per capita product, averaging -1.6 per cent 
per annum and recording slight growth in only two of 
the 11 years, in 1989 and 1990. Minerals exporters 
feced the full brunt of the global uncertainty, achieving 
growth in five of the 10 years, yet with wild swings in 
performance. Overall the per capita product grew on 
average by 1.4 per cent.
By 1982 with the recognition of the global 
debt crisis, the imperative for adjustment could no 
longer be denied. Among the developing countries, 
therefore, the task of economic management and the 
trajectory of economic growth would be determined in 
large measure by the extent to which some had 
accumulated a severe external debt burden while 
others, either by good fortune or by good management, 
had managed to avoid it. For the former countries, 
economic growth throughout the 1980s was 
substantially lower.
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THE GENESIS OF DISEQUILIBRIUM IN THE CARIBBEAN 
- T H E  1970s -
The Caribbean was not immune to global 
developments. Most countries, with the exception of 
Trinidad and Tobago and, to a lesser extent, Barbados, 
were oil importers. They faced a severe adjustment 
problem after the first oil shock which was externally 
derived. But the shock was, in some respects, greater 
for the minerals exporters among them, the Dominican 
Republic, Guyana, Haiti and Jamaica, since they were 
particularly dependent upon petroleum for their 
downstream mining activities. Oil price increases 
shocked their economies by drastically increasing the 
import bill, while at the same time reducing the 
medium-term competitive position of their industries 
vis-à-vis those minerals exporters which were also 
energy self-sufficient, such as Venezuela and Australia.
The immediate impact of the first oil shock 
was cushioned and accordingly the adjustment process 
was deferred for some of them by virtue of windfall 
earnings accruing from sugar and bauxite/alumina 
exports and, after 1974, from export taxes. While these 
earnings could have been used to assist the adjustment 
process by setting in train new energy conserving 
investments, such as tourism in the case of the 
Dominican Republic or Jamaica, or agricultural output 
in Guyana, they were used to raise the subsidies for 
eneigy and food items, increase the public service and 
to finance the expansion of State enterprises. Even the 
substantial funds accruing from these sources were 
insufficient for the task. Moreover they were 
ephemeral, so that when they started to decline debt 
accumulated rapidly in these countries. For these 
countries also debt severely complicated policy in the 
1980s and remained an unwanted legacy in the 1990s. 
So that coterminous with the external shock of oil there 
was a further shock, deriving from domestic policies.
In order to understand the need for structural 
adjustment, which began in earnest in the 1980s and 
continues to the present, it is necessary to be aware of 
the economic structure and policies applicable to these 
countries prior to 1980 and even prior to 1973. The 
section which follows provides a brief outline of the 
genesis of disequilibrium in three of the four countries 
surveyed. The fourth country, Trinidad and Tobago, 
was also in disequilibrium. In the 1970s it was 
however, referred to as a boom with the underlying 
distortions to non-petroleum production disguised by
large inflows of foreign exchange. At that time scant 
regard was paid to the "Dutch disease’ pervading the 
economy, with policy emphasis being placed on 
absorption and distribution of the new found wealth. 
This emphasis was to change as the windfall ended in 
the early 1980s and adjustment o f a more familiar type 
began soon thereafter. This section, therefore, treats 
with the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Jamaica 
only, with the Trinidad and Tobago case study 
commencing in the next section.
A new phase in the recent history of the 
Dominican Republic was reached in 1966, with a 
return to internal stability, after a period of civil 
conflict and the overthrow of the Trujillo dictatorship. 
These developments at the domestic level coincided 
with an external environment which was conducive to 
rapid growth. Accordingly, for the period 1966-1976, 
GDP growth averaged 7.6 per cent. During this 10- 
year period fiscal policies, which included a freeze on 
the size and wages of the public sector, were quite 
restrained, although deficits were incurred. The deficits 
were nevertheless sustainable, since at the end of the 
1960s total foreign debt was 27 per cent of GDP, and 
had actually folien by 1976. Reserves increased steadily 
during the period.
Productive investment was encouraged through 
extensive tax and tariff incentives; the latter leading to 
the development of import substitution industries. 
Growth during the period was, however, essentially 
export driven, since earnings from traditional exports 
such as coffee, sugar, cocoa and tobacco, were 
booming. The minerals sector, comprising ferro-nickel, 
gold, silver, and bauxite expanded rapidly in the 1970s, 
from almost nothing to about 25 per cent of export 
returns by the end of this phase; and services, such as 
tourism and those in the export zones began to grow.
In the light of such rapid export expansion, the 
impact of the oil price increases on the external account 
were initially cushioned by the concurrent boom in 
commodities prices. The impact was also insulated 
from the consumers since the government decided in 
1974 to use the high sugar prices to subsidize the 
increased oil prices. Consumption of petroleum 
products did not therefore respond to the increased
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international prices, and the adjustment opportunity 
offered by the boom was not seized.
The domestic investment policy, based on tax 
and tariff incentives, while expanding activities had 
eroded the tax base. It also encouraged the growth of 
some non-competitive enterprises producing for the 
protected local market. Between 1966-1976, the 
contribution of such sectors to the GDP grew by 9 per 
cent, while the contribution of non-tradables, mainly 
construction, grew by 13 per cent. This policy 
orientation had the effect of narrowing the foreign 
exchange earnings base, and ensuring that public sector 
savings were now only generated by those sectors 
benefiting from the commodities boom. The economy 
was accordingly made more vulnerable to the further 
external shocks which were to come.
Export prices which reached a peak in 1975 
declined by 30 per cent in the years 1977-1979. 
Erosion of the external balance was therefore rapid 
after 1977, the current account deficit growing from 
US$-265 m. in that year to US$676 m. by 1980, the 
fuel bill alone accounting for US$270 m of the increase 
and moving from 22 per cent of merchandise imports 
to 30 per cent in 1980. Output grew fairly strongly in 
1977 and 1978, but as the aforementioned shocks hit 
the economy, GDP growth faltered in 1978 and 
actually declined in 1980.
Public sector savings in the Dominican 
Republic in 1977 were generated by taxes on a narrow 
range of export commodities such as sugar, cocoa, 
coffee, tobacco and by import duties. Property taxes 
are almost non-existent and income taxes are low. 
When the commodities boom ended government 
revenues therefore fell, at a time when imported energy 
prices were poised for their second increase. Tax 
revenues which had amounted to 17 per cent of GDP 
in 1970 fell to 11 per cent by 1978, where it remained 
until 1982 reaching a low of 9 per cent. The impact of 
rising energy prices on the economy was greater than 
it might have been since government savings were 
being used to meet a part of the price increase. 
Accordingly, as was the case with the first oil shock, 
consumption of energy products did not fall with the 
rise in prices, a factor which increased the impact on 
the external account. At the same time basic food 
items, many produced by public enterprises or 
imported, incurred increased subsidies or reduced 
duties in an attempt to insulate the population against
the rising cost of living. The consequent severe impact 
on the government savings, the balance of payments 
and the debt were therefore predictable.
The Dominican Republic after 1977 provides 
an example of the high cost o f postponed adjustment. 
As is the case with Guyana and Jamaica die 
commodities boom of the early 1970s provided the 
means to cushion the impacts of the first oil shock, but 
adjustment was further postponed even when the boom 
had run its course and surpluses were no longer 
available for the purpose. Renewed attempts were made 
to insulate against the effects of the second oil shock 
and to emphasize economic growth, with consequent 
rapid erosion of public savings, the foreign reserves, 
and the external debt.
On Guyana’s attainment of Independence in 
1966 the economy was driven by activities such as 
sugar production, bauxite mining and processing, and 
the distributive trades, all substantially owned by 
private foreign interests. Debt outstanding was modest 
and primarily to the United Kingdom, in the form of 
bilateral loans(59 per cent), and bonds (38 per cent). 
Local business interests were limited to agriculture, 
local trading and minor manufacturing.
The immediate post-Independence phase 
focused on expanding economic and social 
infrastructure through major projects such as sea 
defence, rice rehabilitation, roads, airports, electricity, 
and so on. While the projects for which the debt was 
incurred were not self-liquidating, no difficulty was 
experienced in servicing it since foreign exchange 
earnings had grown foster than the debt, increasing by 
20 per cent between 1966-1970. Moreover, the loans 
were made on concessionary terms, at low interest 
rates and with long grace periods. Accordingly the debt 
service ratio actually declined from 4.3 per cent of 
exports at Independence to 3.4 per cent in 1970.
At the beginning o f the 1970s all the vital 
signs of the Guyanese economy were feirly healthy, 
GDP grew by 3.5 per cent, the external current 
account deficit rested at 9 per cent of GDP while the 
fiscal deficit was one half of that, at 4.5 per cent. The 
external debt represented 35 per cent of GDP.
In 1970 Guyana was declared a Cooperative 
Republic, with one of the central objectives being that 
of securing national ownership and control of domestic
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resources. This policy was to have far-reaching 
implications for Guyana’s fiscal and external accounts, 
its debt profile and its overall economic performance. 
The debt incurred in 1971 due to nationalization 
accounted for 2/3 of the 83 per cent increase in the 
foreign debt of that year. The cost o f nationalization in 
terms of the debt was to grow further in coming years, 
so that by 1976 the external debt consequent on 
nationalization represented 22 per cent of the total debt 
and exceeded the debt incurred up to 1970.7
By the mid-point o f the decade the external 
debt had increased to about 62 per cent of GDP, yet 
because of buoyant export earnings the deficit on the 
current account of the balance of payments averaged 6 
per cent of GDP over the period 1971-1975. The fiscal 
deficit which moved somewhat erratically from year to 
year, nevertheless, averaged 7.6 per cent of GDP over 
the same period, and GDP grew on average by 4 per 
cent. Most vital signs remained good, though danger 
signals were now evident as public spending burgeoned 
by 232 per cent between 1971-1975, the external debt 
increased by over 207 per cent and internal debt by 272 
per cent. In retrospect it might be seen that the vast 
increase in the public sector was facilitated by buoyant 
exports and rapidly increasing debt.
Despite these signs the debt service ratio was 
not significantly different from 1966 at 4.4  per cent, 
and this despite the impact of increased petroleum 
costs, which grew by 134 per cent from 1973-1976. As 
was evident in other countries, the commodity price 
boom of 1974-1975 seemed to disguise the underlying 
deterioration of the economy and induced increased 
public sector spending. By 1976 the debt service ratio 
had however jumped, from 4.4  per cent in 1975 to
12.6 per cent in 1976, and with declining output and 
external prices the stage was set for an economic and 
debt crisis.
By 1977 the economy had begun to contract 
after a period of steady growth throughout the decade. 
An increase of 3.8 per cent in average annual real GDP 
had been achieved between 1970-1976, but 1977 
recorded a real GDP contraction of 4.8  per cent, and 
started a phase of stagnation which was to continue for 
into the future. For the period 1977-1980 GDP 
declined by 4.2 per cent per annum. With decreased 
export performance and high fiscal deficits, (now 
averaging 22 per cent of GDP) the balance of payments 
collapsed, with the deficit on current account averaging
20 per cent of GDP for each of the five years. By 
1980 the external debt had increased to 122 per cent of 
GDP with the internal debt accounting for a similar 
percentage. Public spending continued to grow despite 
attempts to moderate it between 1976-1978. By 1980 it 
was 62 per cent greater than in 1975.
As was the case in other countries, the foil in 
commodity prices precipitated the decline in 
merchandise earnings, a foil in sugar prices being most 
noteworthy, but domestic factors also played their part. 
Foremost among these was a decline in output caused 
by organizational and management problems 
consequent upon the nationalization of the main 
productive sectors, including sugar, bauxite, trading 
companies, oil refining, communications, and some 
manufacturing enterprises. A failure to adjust to these 
declining conditions must also bear some blame for 
subsequent further deterioration. In this regard it will 
be noted that the fiscal current account deficit increased 
steadily between 1977 and 1984, 1982 being the sole 
exception to that trend. While the debt created a 
significant foreign liability, it did not bring forward 
new productive capacity, the change of ownership in 
foct precipitating a decline in output.
Between 1978 and 1980 a number of 
programmes were initiated with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). A standby agreement was 
negotiated in 1978 which had some success in reducing 
the overall public sector deficit from 22 per cent of 
GDP in 1977 to about 6 per cent in 1978, although 
current expenditure in feet increased slightly. In 1979 
an Extended Fund Facility was initiated but abandoned 
in the same year as it foiled to meet targets in the 
external sector, due to continued stagnation in export 
earnings and the impact of the second oil price shock. 
Reduced GDP was recorded for the year. A third 
Extended Fund Facility was formulated for 1980 and 
adopted in 1981 which emphasized increased 
production and diversification, and measures to contain 
the oil price bill. Export earnings for 1980 were quite 
good due to high prices received for bauxite products, 
sugar and rice. Accordingly, merchandise earnings hit 
a peak from which it was to decline to the end of the 
survey period. The increase was particularly fortuitous 
since it provided a cushion against the doubling of oil 
prices in 1979/1980, still allowing a GDP growth of 
about 2 per cent. Between 1970-1980 the exchange rate 
moved only marginally, from G$2.0 per US$ in 1970 
to G$2.55 in 1976, where it remained until 1981.
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Similarly, in Jamaica, thel960s saw relatively 
high rates of economic growth, on average 6.6 per cent 
between 1961-1970. Growth was driven by strong 
external demand for bauxite/alumina exports, and 
burgeoning tourism, which necessitated increasing 
investment in these sectors. The expansion was 
financed by net capital inflows in the form of private 
direct foreign investment. For the period 1966-1971 net 
private capital flows exceeded the current account 
deficit by almost 9 per cent.8 This surplus together with 
modest official capital flows, official flows being on 
average 7 per cent of private flows, together created a 
substantial increase in the reserves.
In 1970 GDP grew by 7.7 per cent, the public 
sector deficit stood at 3 per cent of GDP, the deficit on 
external current account was 11 per cent. The external 
debt burden was quite manageable since the public debt 
was less than 16 per cent of GDP and debt service 
represented less than 3 per cent of exports of goods 
and services.
For the first three years of the 1970s the 
growth performance of the previous decade continued 
though at a reduced rate averaging 5 per cent; but by 
1973 the impact of domestic and external factors had 
caused a change in previous trends. On the domestic 
front public expenditures expanded rapidly, in an 
attempt to deal simultaneously with issues of equity, to 
expand public sector activities, and to consolidate 
public ownership of the main income generating 
sectors. Accordingly, the overall public sector deficit 
began a long and steady growth averaging 46 per cent 
per annum between the fiscal years 1971/72 and 
1973/74. At the same time the effects of the first oil 
shock were about to be felt. In 1973 alone, the external 
debt, reflecting these facts, but mainly due to the rapid 
growth in the fiscal deficit, grew by 129 per cent 
jumping from 8-18 per cent of GDP.
Between 1974-1975 the full force of the oil 
price increases impacted upon the import bill, 
expenditure for fuels increasing by 195 per cent 
between 1973-1975. The importance of the impact is 
shown by the fact that 28 per cent of merchandise 
exports was now needed to pay for oil compared to less 
than 15 per cent in 1972. By the end of 1975 the 
growth of export earnings which had hitherto been 
buoyant slowed down to 6 per cent, output of the 
manufacturing sector peaking in 1973, and 
bauxite/alumina in 1974.
In 1975 GDP declined for the second 
consecutive year, the fiscal deficit had grown to 8 per 
cent of GDP, but because of still buoyant export 
earnings the current deficit of the balance of payments 
was reduced to under 10 per cent. A window of 
opportunity existed after the first oil shock which 
would have permitted difficult but manageable 
adjustment by the end of 1975, had not the fiscal 
deficit run out of control. A large portion of this deficit 
went into public ownership.
In 1976 a number of adverse developments, 
both domestic and external, came together to cause the 
collapse of the economy; export prices fell; output fell 
for sugar, bananas and alumina; and tourism receipts 
which had been declining steadily from 1972, fell by 
38 per cent over the previous year. As a consequence 
of this conjuncture of events, export earnings as a 
whole declined by 15 per cent. Reflecting the decline 
in the economy, current revenues declined by 8 per 
cent in fiscal year 1976/1977 although current 
expenditures continued to grow by 26 per cent. For the 
first time there was a current account deficit, and in an 
effort to stimulate activity in the economy, capital 
expenditure also increased by 10 per cent. The overall 
fiscal deficit in feet more than doubled in 1976 
representing 15.5 per cent of GDP.
By 1977 the Jamaican economy was 
sufficiently in disequilibrium to warrant a serious effort 
to readjust. The assumptions on which past policies had 
been predicated, and particularly the expectation of 
continued strong export earnings, had not been realized 
and the economy continued in recession. Foreign 
commercial banks had suspended lending and social 
programmes continued to place heavy demands upon 
the budget.
Accordingly between 1977 and early 1980 
Jamaican economic policy operated in close relationship 
with the International Monetary Fund. Measures to 
bring the economy once more into equilibrium were 
taken, and included a curb on public expenditures, 
restrictions on monetary expansion and a devaluation of 
the currency. Not surprisingly in the light of these 
policy measures, GDP contracted throughout the 
period. Yet imports, which contracted sharply in 1977, 
continued to grow fester than exports thereafter. Public 
spending despite reductions in the capital account 
continued to grow on average of almost 17 per cent per 
annum between 1977 and 1980.
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While external capital flows resumed with the 
onset of Fund programmes, domestic investor 
confidence had been sufficiently eroded for local capital 
flight, estimated at US$246 million in 1978, to nullify 
such inflows, which were US$176.5 million.9 For the 
first time Jamaica had a net outflow of private capital. 
The phenomenon of capital flight was in this case 
fuelled by low investor confidence, negative real 
interest rates and a perception that despite a large 
devaluation the currency was still overvalued, given the 
underlying economic performance. This capital flight 
was to continue until 1983.
At the end of 1977 external debt stood at 
U.S.$926.2 million, or 28 per cent of GDP, and the 
debt service ratio at 14.5 per cent. By 1980 the debt 
had grown to US$ 1.7 billion, equivalent to 65 per cent 
of GDP and the debt service ratio had increased to 24 
per cent, if  interest accruals are included.
Over the 1970s GDP began its decline from 
1974, averaging a contraction of 3.2 per cent per 
annum for the rest of the decade. The fiscal deficit 
which was 3 per cent of GDP in 1970 widened to 8 per 
cent in 1974 and further to 21 per cent by 1980. The
balance of payments current account which was in 
deficit to the tune of 11 per cent of GDP in 1970 
remained under 10 per cent by 1975 because of 
buoyant export earnings. By 1980, however, this 
deficit had fallen to 6 per cent of GDP as exports 
expanded somewhat, but mainly because of severe 
import compression. There was however significant 
pent up demand for imports as public expenditures 
remained strong. The external debt by now had grown 
from 29 per cent of GDP in mid-decade to 65 per cent 
by 1980.
During the period economic policy was subject 
to much national debate. This was because IMF 
policies were not achieving a consensus within the 
administration and were abandoned by early 1980. The 
adjustment process was therefore hampered by policy 
inconsistency and uncertainty, a factor which also 
contributed to capital flight, which continued albeit at 
a reduced rate in 1980 in spite of an expected change 
of government. Accordingly, the unsettled domestic 
economic climate further contributed to the growth of 
the debt since it had to be incurred not only to finance 
current transactions but also to compensate for capital 
flight.
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ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN THE 1980s
The 1980s was generally regarded to be a lost 
decade for many Caribbean countries as they became 
bogged down in the process of readjusting their 
economies to face the changed circumstances of the 
1980s. All of the four countries chosen as case studies 
were minerals exporters as they were most severely
affected by these changes. Three of them, the bauxite 
producers were already in severe disequilibrium at the 
beginning of the decade, while the fourth, Trinidad and 
Tobago, the sole exporter of petrochemicals, suffered 
the shock of collapsing oil prices and went into 
disequilibrium soon thereafter.
The Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic entered the 1980s developed countries and consequent reduced demand
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feeing a number of adverse external developments. 
Terms of trade shocks were due to volatile sugar and 
minerals export prices, the former reaching a sharp 
peak in 1981, and oil price increases which caused the 
import bill for this commodity to increase 10-fold 
between 1973-1980. There was also a deterioration in 
exports, the volume index declining by 20 per cent 
between 1978-1982, due to the recession in the
for sugar, bauxite and ferro-nickel. The third element 
of the external deterioration was due to increasing 
global interest rates, which tripled the cost of debt 
service between 1978-1982. At the same time, domestic 
performance in manufactures began to decline and 
fiscal revenues began to contract.
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Underlying all these factors was the secular 
decline of sugar. This is demonstrated by the feet that 
sugar averaged 50 per cent of merchandise exports for 
the period 1969-1971, 34 per cent between 1979-81, 
but only 18 per cent for 1989-90. The adjustment task 
feced by the Dominican Republic narrowed itself 
essentially to finding export earnings to substitute for 
declining sugar receipts and to establishing a 
reorientation of the fiscal accounts, severely burdened 
by inefficient public sector enterprises.
An adequate domestic policy response was not 
forthcoming in the 1980s, although greater progress 
was made in the theoretically more difficult task of 
finding export alternatives to sugar, than on 
establishing fiscal balance. Accordingly, once the 
determination was made to adjust the fiscal side, in 
1990, the goal was achieved feirly rapidly. 
Macroeconomic policy passed through three phases, 
which began in 1982, 1985, and 1990. In the first 
phase, feltering attempts were made to adjust the 
economy, but this resulted in stagnation in 1984 and 
feirly severe economic contraction in 1985. Attempts 
were made thereafter to stimulate the economy as early 
as 1985. Following a change of government, while 
much of the external sector policies remained, the 
emphasis of fiscal policy was placed more firmly on 
stimulating economic activity, mainly through 
construction activities. This was intended to reactivate 
economic growth, and managed to do so in 1986 and 
1987, but at a cost of widening the external deficit, 
postponing the fiscal adjustment and increasing the rate 
of inflation. Thereafter, growth contracted, the external 
deficit resulting in currency depreciation which in tum 
fuelled inflation which increased on average by over 50 
per cent per annum between 1988-1991. In May 1990, 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) was initiated, with 
the objectives of reducing inflation, returning to 
growth, eliminating the deficit, unifying the exchange 
rate and initiating a number of policy reforms. By 1992 
most of the objectives had been met, in so fer as 
stabilization was concerned and growth returned, 
although the challenge of maintaining stable growth 
over the medium term remained.
Uncertain adjustment
As was outlined in the introduction, feirly high 
rates of growth were achieved in the period 1981 to 
1983, but this was achieved at high cost in terms of the 
external account, the reserves and the debt. Such 
growth was unsustainable so that with the onset of 
adjustment the economy lost some of the headway
made in earlier years, contracting in 1984-1985. 
Adverse consequences were most evident in the fiscal 
and external accounts.
On the fiscal side the causes were twofold. 
Tax revenues stagnated between 1979-1982. While the 
central government deficit averaged about 2.5 per cent 
of GDP from 1980-1983, the overall public sector 
deficit, which included transfers to a number of loss- 
making public enterprises, averaged about 5.7 per cent 
of GDP over the same period.
Between 1978-1980 the current deficit on the 
balance of payments doubled, resting at 10 per cent of 
G.D.P. by 1980. This was due in large part to the fuel 
bill, which accounted for US$270 m. of the increase 
and represented an increase from 22 per cent of 
merchandise imports to 30 per cent by 1980. Although 
some action was taken to compress imports thereafter, 
the reduced level of imports was insufficient to 
safeguard against significantly increased external debt, 
the official component of which grew by 170 per cent 
between 1979-1982. Reserves were rapidly depleted 
after 1977, when they stood at about US$1 m ., to US$ 
-391 million in 1981.
Adjustment efforts in the Dominican Republic 
began in the second half of 1982, only when the 
nation’s creditworthiness had been eroded, so that new 
funds to finance the domestic and foreign deficits were 
difficult to obtain. Accordingly, the measures finally 
adopted needed to be quite stringent and to focus on 
containing the short-term crisis. The stabilization 
programme, negotiated in conjunction with the IMF 
and begun in 1983, focused on the containment of 
public expenditures, liberalization of the foreign 
exchange regime and included some debt rescheduling. 
It was implemented in the fece of much public debate 
and had to be renegotiated some months later.
In the first year of the programme scant 
progress was achieved in reducing the fiscal or external 
deficits, although current revenue increased as a 
proportion of GDP and growth resumed after a weak 
performance in 1982. Efforts were redoubled in early 
1984, all products except petroleum being subject to 
the parallel exchange rate and even that was included 
by mid-year. Nevertheless, some impact was being 
made on the external account. From 1980 the deficit on 
current account began to contract primarily due to the 
compression of imports, essentially consumer goods, so 
that by 1984 fuel imports constituted 40 per cent of the 
(contracted) imports.
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After further policy uncertainty in 1984 a new 
adjustment programme was initiated in January 1985, 
which emphasized a realignment of exchange rates, 
deflation of the economy and refinancing of the debt. 
There was, however, a large measure of inconsistency 
in the programme which sought to compensate for 
weak external performance with an expansionary fiscal 
policy. It was expected that this would be financed by 
increased fiscal revenues so that deficits could be
contained. The reality was that although central
government deficits were contained, the overall deficits 
increased because of weak public enterprises.
In the first year, 1985, these policies took 
effect in conjunction with a decline in the price of the 
main exports, severe drought and political uncertainty 
in the lead-up to a general election, due in the
following year. The outcome was that there was a
sharp decline in GDP, and a widening of the deficit on 
external current account. The fiscal stimulus was 
unable to halt the economic decline in that year, but 
managed to erode much of the progress achieved in 
reducing the fiscal deficit o f the central government.
Growth was resumed in 1986 due to the 
lagged effects of the 1985 stimulus, and was driven for 
the rest of the decade by continued public investment, 
capital expenditure growing fivefold by the end of the 
decade. While a small surplus was achieved on central 
government account by 1989 despite this massive 
spending programme, the consolidated fiscal deficit 
remained in excess of 7 per cent of GDP by the end of 
the decade because of the parlous state of the public 
enterprises.
For the period 1986-1989 the merchandise 
deficit grew steadily, merchandise earnings fluctuating 
between US$700-900 m. over the decade, while 
imports grew steadily between 1986-1989. The most 
notable trend in the balance of payments was, however, 
to be seen in services earnings. The latter reflected the 
underlying adjustment of the economy away from sole 
dependence on sugar toward free-zones and tourism, 
moving the services account rapidly into surplus for the 
first time in 1986, a surplus which was to grow rapidly 
and unbroken until the present. By the end of 1991 
earnings from services were almost double the earnings 
derived from trade. Despite this sterling performance 
on the services side, the external deficit on current 
account averaged somewhat over 4 per cent of GDP for 
the period 1986-1989, with a peak of 8.3 per cent in
Adjustment with growth? 1987, no doubt reflecting the huge fiscal stimulus in 
1987.
The external performance had its consequences 
in an erosion of the exchange rate, which was 
nominally market determined after 1985 and moved 
from an average of 2.9 in 1986 to 6.34 in 1989. Yet 
the exchange regime had been capriciously modified by 
decree to change from a free float to fixed rates at 
times multiple rates. In effect the official rates were not 
credible, with the parallel rate 45 per cent higher than 
the official rate by the end of 1989-early 1990. The 
external debt increased by 14 per cent. Another notable 
indicator related to debt service, which grew by 36 per 
cent between 1985-1986, and caused a shift in policy 
by the incoming government to suspend debt servicing 
for the remainder of the decade. Accordingly, arrears 
accumulated which amounted to US$520 m. by end 
1990, which would ultimately restrict access to new 
sources of credit. Prices rose rapidly from single digit 
inflation in 1986 to average a median annual variation 
of over 35 per cent for the following three years and a 
variation of over 100 per cent between December of 
1989 and December o f 1990.
The phase of adjustment with growth did not 
achieve much adjustment and the goal of growth, to 
which all other policy elements were sacrificed, 
became unsustainable after 1989. Some success was 
achieved in increasing revenues which had declined 
steadily since 1980. By 1982 current revenues had 
reached a low of 9.4  per cent of GDP but the 
proportion increased to over 17 per cent by 1988, 
although it has declined since. While criticism might 
be levelled at the composition of current and capital 
expenditure, since much of the construction was in 
non-productive projects, the overall quantum of 
expenditure, as expended at the central government 
level, did not create significant strain on the economy. 
Enormous transfers had to be made to non-viable 
public enterprises, however, so that the public finances 
deteriorated progressively.
In an effort to control the effect o f fiscal 
permissiveness on the external accounts, the exchange 
rate regime tended to be unpredictable and inconsistent 
and a number of administrative controls were invoked 
on external trade. Price controls were also used to try 
to control the inflationary effects of the deficit, but this 
was doomed to fail and inevitably resulted in shortages. 
Investment in productive capacity fell, capital flight 
increased and the efficiency of such investment as took 
place, continued to decline because of the unpredictable
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and distorting effects of a number of the policy 
instruments, including selective interest rates. 
Accordingly, the economy lost the opportunity to 
equilibrate itself and move to the next stage of 
rebuilding social and economic infrastructure and 
expanding productive capacity.
The New Economic Policy
In the face of a severe economic crisis and 
after general elections a New Economic Policy was 
proclaimed in May 1990, underpinned by an economic 
solidarity pact between labour and business and which 
included a labour code. Where growth was given 
primacy in the past the new policy, which formed the 
platform of the incumbent party, now placed 
adjustment in the ascendency. The policy focused on 
the following elements:
Balanced fiscal policy;
Single market determined exchange rate; 
Market determined interest rates, with 
minimal administrative controls to the 
financial system;
Policy reform, to relate to taxation, 
international trade, public administration and 
foreign investment, labour relations and 
industrial restructuring.
While it is still too soon to see the full effect 
of policy reforms, some progress has been made 
relating to the short-term indicators. The immediate 
economic emergency of 1990 seemed to be contained. 
Product which collapsed by over 5 per cent in 1990 
was contained to a decline of 0.5 per cent in 1991 and 
growth, estimated to be nearly 7 per cent, resumed in
1992. End year price changes which were over 100 per 
cent in 1990, were contained to 4 per cent in 1991 and
1992. The overall fiscal deficit which was almost 6 per 
cent in 1990 was reduced to less than 1 per cent in 
1991.
External sector performance improved, thanks 
mainly to private capital inflows, consequent on more 
credible exchange and interest rate policies. After being 
moved progressively from 6.3 in early 1990 the 
parallel and official rates were unified at 12.9 in June 
1991 and were subsequently market determined. Since 
then the rate has stabilized at 12.8 (August 1992). 
Current capital outflows of US$300 m. in 1990 were 
replaced by inflows of over US$250 m. in 1991. Debt
relief of over US$800 m. allowed a repayment of most 
of the arrears outstanding and a rebuilding of reserves 
of US$380 m. The merchandise trade deficit widened 
slightly, however, since the sources of merchandise 
earnings, which needed a structural transformation, 
were unlikely to recover substantially in the short 
term. Services earnings including exports from free- 
zones, however, continued to grow and are expected 
to constitute the mainstay of earnings growth for the 
short to medium term.
Longer-term reform of taxation policy is 
designed to make it more equitable, resilient and stable. 
Subsidies have for the most part been removed, from 
commodities to the public and from public enterprises. 
The objectives of the new fiscal code are to make it 
internally consistent, to update the fiscal administration 
to increase its efficiency, to implement measures for 
permanently updating the real values of revenues, to 
increase the fiscal burden to make it more compatible 
with the level of development of the country, to protect 
wage earners in times of high inflation and to simplify 
the system so as to achieve a more equitable and 
transparent code and one that could be more efficiently 
collected.
A major element of tax reform policy, but one 
also having significant influence upon the longer term 
direction of the production structure, relates to tariff 
reform. Trade taxes have been simplified and 
increased, export taxes have been eliminated. The 
reform has consolidated the tariff schedule into seven 
ad-valorem import tax rates, from the previous 140, 
felling within a range of between 5-35 per cent. The 
market exchange rate will be used for valuation. The 
new schedule allows for a four year transitional period, 
during which the average nominal tariff rate will fell 
from 90 per cent to 20 per cent, if  completion is 
achieved on schedule.
This new regime represents a significant 
simplification from one which suffered from the burden 
of 27 separate laws regulating imports. Previously there 
were three fixed exchange rates, applied to five 
different combinations of specific and ad-valorem 
taxes, making 15 different ways to impose duties. The 
new tariff is expected to improve the competitiveness 
of industry, to streamline the administrative 
arrangements surrounding international trade and make 
the new regulations less amenable to arbitrary 
interpretation.
Guyana
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Guyana provides an example of an economy in 
which disequilibrium was allowed to increase over an 
extended period without appropriate adjustment policies 
being taken. The result was a steady haemorrhage of 
resources away from the formal economy, either 
abroad in the case o f capital or skills, or into the 
informal parallel market where skills, capital and goods 
were diverted. The State is estimated to have controlled 
80 per cent of the formal economy in 1980. This 
transfer of resources was therefore an unwitting 
transfer from the State sector to private actors who, 
because of the regulatory framework which favoured 
the State sector, had to operate outside of the formal 
economy in order to survive. The transfer was 
sufficient to lead some analysts to estimate that before 
remedial measures began, the informal economy had 
grown to enormous proportions, most believing that it 
exceeded the formal one in size.
At the start of the 1980s the Guyanese 
economy was already in severe disequilibrium. This is 
demonstrated by the feet that for the period 1979-1981 
the external current deficit averaged over 20 per cent 
of GDP and the fiscal deficit averaged one third of 
GDP. In both cases the deficit was increasing rapidly. 
In 1980 the external debt was already three quarters of 
GDP.
The Guyanese policy environment and its 
relationship to adjustment may be understood if  the 
survey period is seen to represent two distinct phases, 
the first from 1980-1987 and the second phase from 
1988 to the present. In the first phase scánt effort was 
made to adjust the economy in any consistent feshion. 
This phase will be characterised as "Disequilibrium 
Ignored". Initially the economy contracted severely 
between 1981-1983, as a result of internal and external
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shocks. Slow growth was resumed for the period 1984- 
1986, as the adverse external environment improved. 
The initial growth impulse received in 1984 weakened 
progressively to 1986, however, and by 1987 the 
economy began to contract once more.
The second phase which began in 1988 will 
be characterised as one of "Committed Adjustment", 
when a comprehensive adjustment programme with 
integrated and complementary policies was finally 
adopted. This set of policies was implemented in 
conjunction with financing programmes from the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. Given the size 
of the disequilibrium which existed at this time and the 
magnitude of the policy changes necessary, it is not 
surprising that the period 1988-1990 witnessed great 
economic instability and further economic contraction, 
although strong growth was resumed in 1991 and 
sustained in 1992 as the policies seemed to take effect.
Disequilibrium ignored
For the three years 1981-1983 GDP declined, 
the most significant fell being recorded for the years
1982-1983 which averaged -9.8 per cent. This severe 
economic contraction was attributable to a decline in 
export earnings for Guyana's main exports, bauxite, 
sugar and rice as a result of intractable technical, 
financial and organizational problems in the industries. 
Poor weather further affected sugar and rice yields. At 
the same time earnings were affected by weak external 
demand and the consequent felling prices. These 
developments precipitated a devaluation in mid-1981, 
although the external current account continued to 
widen, averaging almost 32 per cent of product for the 
years 1982-1983.
During this period, public finances continued 
to deteriorate since expenditures continued to rise, 
while revenues reflecting poor economic performance 
declined. Most significantly, however, public 
corporations which had previously contributed to the 
current account now required public subsidies, 
necessitating increased borrowing. The fiscal deficit as 
a result averaged nearly 70 per cent of product over 
the three-year period.
Between 1980 and 1983 the external public 
debt more than doubled. If this was taken in 
conjunction with the severe contraction of GDP, the 
debt increased in proportion to product from 76 per 
cent in 1980 to the considerably larger proportion of 
197 per cent by 1983.
The composition of the debt had by this time 
also changed, new inflows coming mainly from 
bilateral and multilateral financial institutions such as 
the IMF, IDB, and the World Bank, in their attempts 
to assist the government to stabilize and adjust the 
economy. In feet bilateral debt peaked in 1980, to 
decline slowly thereafter. Multilateral debt had grown 
slowly but steadily from 1977 and was to surpass 
bilateral debt after 1985.
Public sector enterprises made severe demands 
on new funds, foreign financing being needed by some 
domestic enterprises not having the capability to repay 
in foreign exchange. Accordingly commercial debt was 
to increase steadily until 1980 tapering off slowly 
thereafter as no new money was forthcoming. By 1980 
reserves had become negative, by almost US$185 m. 
and by 1981 the system had begun to accumulate 
arrears in the servicing of the debt. In 1982 it became 
necessary to engage in a further rescheduling exercise. 
Moreover it was now becoming increasingly difficult to 
obtain new external financing since arrears were 
accumulating at an increasing rate, US$34 m. in 1981, 
US$126 m. in 1982, to US$270 m. in 1983.
For the years 1984 to 1986 the economy 
resumed moderate growth averaging just over 1 per 
cent but initial growth o f over 2 per cent in 1984 was 
never surpassed as the economy lost momentum 
thereafter. Export earnings recovered from the nadir 
of 1983 and stabilized for the following three years at 
a figure maiginally higher, mainly as a result of 
recovering earnings from the bauxite subsector up to
1985, with sugar increases compensating in 1986. The 
exchange rate was adjusted twice in 1984. On the 
second occasion the parity was linked to a basket of 
five major currencies. While there was a slow erosion 
of the currency thereafter, changes were still subject to 
administrative control and were insufficient to bring the 
external account into balance, given the fiscal policies 
being pursued. Nevertheless, the current deficit on 
external account narrowed slightly, to 27 per cent of 
product, compared with a deficit averaging 32 per cent 
for the previous three years. Overall public sector 
fiscal deficits continued to grow, averaging 91 per cent 
of product for the three-year period, owing mainly to 
the unresolved problems of the public sector 
enterprises.
The period is characterized by a modest 
increase in the actual inflows of new debt, which 
recorded 2 per cent growth between the end of 1983 to
1986, due mainly to an inability to secure new loans.
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Increases, such as they were, came mainly from 
multilateral sources. Debt arrears had continued to 
mount rapidly, reflecting the inability of the economy 
to meet outstanding obligations. In 1983 the country 
was able to meet almost one half of its debt servicing 
costs, but by 1986 this capacity was reduced to only
16.5 per cent of scheduled debt repayments. If the 
accumulated arrears are included, however, the debt 
continued to mount steeply moving from under 200 per 
cent of product in 1983 to over 300 per cent of product 
by the end of 1986. Owing to the unavailability of 
external funds government deficits were increasingly 
covered by local borrowing after 1982 which had the 
effect of stifling any attempts by the private sector to 
raise funds on the formal capital markets.
By the end of 1986 the Guyanese economy 
was in a state of torpor, with growth in that year barely 
positive. The enormous debt problem had serious 
negative effects on Guyana’s economy. The country 
was unable to obtain new financing for investment or 
even for suppliers’ credits to finance normal trade 
transactions. Consequent cash flow problems forced the 
use of cash to finance current transactions, or where 
this was not available in sufficient quantities, to resort 
to counter trade. More significantly, individuals 
resorted to informal measures in order to survive and 
a significant portion of the economy was no longer 
subject to formal regulation or even accounting. For 
the longer term, the need to operate on a day to day 
basis, distracted policy attention from the need to take 
the fundamental longer term structural and 
organizational measures needed to reincorporate and 
resuscitate the economy.
Performance in 1987 was mixed, for while the 
growth impulse of the previous period had ended and 
product fell by over 3 per cent, a number of other 
indicators began to improve since both the fiscal and 
external deficits contracted. Export performance 
improved for all the traditional staples, owing to a 
propitious external environment and favourable climatic 
conditions while imports remained stable. Fiscal 
performance also showed some consequent 
improvement as revenues improved and capital 
spending was curtailed. Current expenditure remained 
out of control, however, and while government 
demonstrated some willingness to begin adjustment 
success would only be achieved with more stringent 
and coordinated measures.
By the middle of 1988 Guyana embraced new 
economic policies which emphasised deregulation and 
departed substantially from the near command economy 
pursued since Independence. These policies, which 
received the support of the international financial 
institutions, held out the prospect not only of putting 
the economy on a viable footing but also of some 
forgiveness of the huge debt and renewed external 
capital flows to assist economic recovery. Once 
announced, in the first quarter of 1989, the policies 
were implemented with despatch.
Prices were decontrolled, initially with food 
and consumer items in 1988, so that only sugar 
remains controlled. Trade was substantially liberalized, 
tariffs coming into line with other CARICOM countries 
which were themselves in the process of progressively 
reducing their Common External Tariff. Import 
prohibitions on food and other items were rescinded.
The trade in foreign currency was liberalized, 
initially by establishing a dual system, of private 
originally parallel market dealers or cambios operating 
in conjunction with the banks. While the banks 
operated a fixed administered rate, the private dealers 
continued to operate market determined rates. 
Gradually various categories of transactions were 
transferred formally to the cambios and the official rate 
moved to converge with the cambio rate, until both 
rates were unified in 1991. Since September 1991 the 
single official exchange rate has been fully responsive 
to market forces in a free float. While the depreciation 
needed was steep and created inflationary pressures, the 
process was a relatively orderly one.
With respect to the productive sectors, which 
were substantially State owned, the eventual goal of 
full privatization was enunciated with many state 
enterprises slated to be sold, closed or leased. In the 
interim, some of the larger operations, such as the 
bauxite and sugar industries, were to be rationalized 
and made more efficient prior to their divestment.
Policies intended to reduce the fiscal deficit 
and make the budget more robust were put into place. 
Revenues were increased by new tax measures, the 
elimination of a number of tax exemptions and by 
recouping the real cost o f utilities such as electricity,
Committed adjustment
which increased by a factor of four in real terms 
between 1989-1991. A one time tax was levied on 
commercial banks to capture some of the windfall gains 
accruing to them as a result of currency depreciation. 
A more comprehensive tax reform programme was also 
being prepared for implementation in 1992. Recurrent 
expenses were cut by reducing the number of 
government ministries from 18 to 11 and a number of 
posts eliminated. Wage guidelines for public officials 
limited salary increases to a ceiling of 20 per cent. 
Capital spending remained modest, given the parlous 
state of the economy, but were refocused on 
rehabilitating the depreciating infrastructure.
Monetary policy was modified to better reflect 
market forces. Competitive bids for treasury bills were 
initiated in 1991 and provided the Central Bank with 
information for setting the bank rate. Banks were 
subsequently allowed to set competitive interest rates 
and discriminatory credit policies were abandoned.
It took some time for these far reaching 
policies to bear fruit. Social and economic dislocations 
and unfavourable weather conditions worked together 
to postpone economic growth, and product fell in the 
years 1989-1990. Strikes and work stoppages reduced 
output in the traditional export sectors. Power outages 
also adversely affected production. In the first phases 
of currency realignment the traditional export sectors 
were also disadvantaged, since they remained on the 
old fixed exchange rate which lagged behind the 
cambios, to which the non-traditionals were linked and 
from which they reaped commensurate benefits. 
Flooding in 1990 impeded sugar and rice production 
and inundated the mines. Both fiscal and balance of 
payments indicators accordingly deteriorated during this 
period. Fiscal performance was adversely affected by 
the poor performance of the traditional export sectors 
sugar and bauxite, which were State enterprises so 
affecting the public sector performance directly. 
Consumer prices increased sharply owing to the 
removal of subsidies and the effects of currency 
depreciation.
With the major elements of the reform 
programme in place by 1991 growth resumed and was 
sustained into 1992, despite the country having to face 
a turbulent election and a change of government for the 
first time since Independence in 1966. Growth 
exceeded 6 per cent in 1991 and is estimated to have 
exceed 7 per cent in 1992. Growth was led by 
improved export performance, notably due to increased 
agricultural output. Rice exports were stimulated by
price deregulation and sugar benefited from industry 
rationalization and reinvestment. Performance in the 
mining sector was mixed, with poor bauxite/alumina 
performance, though in both years gold and diamond 
output increased dramatically, as official prices more 
accurately reflected those of the free market. In part 
this increase reflected the reincorporation of gold and 
diamonds into the formal economy.
The trade deficit was accordingly reduced in 
1991 as exports increased faster than imports. 
Increased interest payments on the external debt had 
their effect on the current account which only fell 
maiginally from the previous year. Capital flows from 
multilateral agencies as well as some debt relief and 
inflows consequent on the divestment of some public 
enterprises allowed the replenishment of reserves. The 
external debt fell slightly.
The fiscal deficit fell in relation to product 
from the previous year, mainly as a result of improved 
performance by the public enterprises which achieved 
a surplus. Current revenue exceeded targets because of 
better tax administration, although debt servicing costs 
eroded the gains that had been made elsewhere on the 
current expenditure budget. Capital expenditure was 
constrained by the shortage of counterpart funding and 
limited to urgent infrastructure repair. Inflation 
remained high in 1991, with an average growth of 80 
per cent, although the rate of growth moderated in the 
second half of the year. This cooling off was sustained 
in 1992 as price increases averaged IS per cent for the 
year.
This phase of the adjustment programme has 
shown remarkable progress in a short time, yet serious 
problems remain. The short-term indicators are being 
brought into balance but the debt remains to complicate 
the task of adjustment. A number of policies has been 
initiated to encourage export performance, notably the 
revised foreign exchange regime, the deregulation of 
prices and the programme of rationalization and 
divestment of the main public sector enterprises. The 
debt complicates the fiscal programme and the 
resumption of repayments has minimised the progress 
made in establishing fiscal balance. Yet debt 
forgiveness, which has started, seems to be the only 
way to enable the economy to regain a firm foundation. 
A backlog of public works focusing on basic 
infrastructure needs to be reduced to stimulate 
economic expansion. A number of social programmes 
have also deteriorated which unless fixed will further 
limit the quality of life and human performance.
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Jamaica commenced the 1980s with an 
economy in severe disequilibrium. This is illustrated by 
some basic indicators for the years 1979-1980 inclusive 
where the economy contracted on average by 3.8 per 
cent, the external current account was in deficit 
equivalent to over 6 per cent of product and the fiscal 
deficit averaged 14 per cent of product. The external 
debt averaged 57 per cent of GDP or 115 per cent of 
exports of goods and services. In all cases the 
indicators were deteriorating from 1979.
Despite the stated commitment o f a new 
administration to its correction, the decade was spent in 
trying to meet that objective and the effort continues 
into the decade of the 1990s. In the first five years the 
major economic indicators actually worsened, under a 
foiled attempt to adjust through economic expansion.
During this period global developments were 
not fevourable and most notably a precipitous decline 
in bauxite/alumina earnings served to complicate the 
adjustment task. Some adjustment was evident from 
1986 to the end of 1988, but it was faltering and finally 
derailed by hurricane damage in the third quarter of 
that year. The hurricane, which was the most serious 
natural disaster in over 100 years, destroyed not only 
the major sources of wealth generation but required a 
reversal of the painfully achieved trend toward reduced 
government fiscal deficits. Nineteen eighty-nine saw a 
new administration committed to rigorous adjustment 
and a policy of deregulation, the latter chosen perhaps 
in order to remove many o f the policy elements from 
capricious control. But by the end of the survey period 
it became evident that even a deregulated economy 
required careful and consistent economic policies.
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By 1981 domestic economic policies in 
Jamaica had changed, with the advent of a new 
administration. Negotiations had been reopened with 
the IMF and a new Extended Fund Facility was agreed. 
Based on the premise that the period 1974-1980 had 
witnessed a cumulative decline o f 16 per cent in GDP 
and a reduction in the capital stock, the new 
programme placed heavy reliance on external savings 
to resuscitate the economy. In feet, given the political 
climate in which these new policies were adopted, such 
bilateral inflows were to be forthcoming and perhaps 
provided the mistaken impression that they could on 
their own, provide sufficient impulses to pull the fiscal 
and external accounts into equilibrium.
Within this context, the adjustment programme 
in 1981 was intended to orient the economy towards 
export promotion rather than import substitution, and 
a new trade regime was adopted to reduce the anti- 
export bias of the economy. While the exchange rate 
was to be a part of this package its use was delayed 
until 1983 and even then its use was tentative, an error 
of judgement which was made tenable in part because 
of strong bilateral capital inflows. The programme also 
had the objective of balancing the fiscal account. A 
multi-year public investment programme was prepared 
so as to provide a broad overview of all public sector 
activities, to make their operations more transparent, 
controllable and responsive to the aims of the 
structural adjustment programme. In line with the 
declaration that government would provide a fecilitating 
rather than direct role for the productive sector, a 
number of the existing public sector enterprises were to 
be closed, others earmarked for divestment to the 
private sector and the remainder to be put on a viable 
footing.
Moderate economic growth, averaging about 
2 per cent per annum, was achieved between 1981-
1983. This compares with a contraction averaging 
about 2.7 per cent for the previous three-year period. 
This growth which was due to aforementioned external 
capital flows was, however, achieved at the price of a 
rapid increase in the external debt, which grew on 
average by 19 per cent per annum between 1980-1983. 
Capital flight which had moderated between 1980-1982 
was resurgent by 1983, reflecting once more doubts 
about economic policy. Export earnings had also 
contracted after 1981, due to declines in traditional 
agricultural exports, but especially in the alumina and
Adjustment with growth? bauxite sectors, hit by reduced global demand. The 
merchandise trade deficit accordingly increased 
significantly between 1980-1983 and in the light of the 
increasing debt so did the external debt which was over 
80 per cent of GDP or 239 per cent of exports of 
goods and services in 1983. This decline was recorded 
in spite of a resurgent tourism industry.
By October 1983 the Extended Fund Facility 
which was due for completion by March 1985 had to 
be abandoned due to an inability to meet the planned 
targets. The fiscal deficit then stood at 20 per cent of 
GDP as compared to the target of 10.5 per cent, and 
the Balance of Payments deficit was US$362 million 
compared with a targeted surplus of US$125 million. 
A major fector in the non-compliance with targets was 
exogenously derived, an unanticipated decline in 
bauxite/alumina earnings, upon which the economy and 
all the targets had been dependent for viability. Had 
these remained the same as in 1981 near balance would 
have been achieved on current account.
Orthodox adjustment
After 1984 a new emphasis was placed on 
adjusting the economy and managing the growing 
external debt. This new policy was spearheaded by a 
one-year Standby Arrangement with the International 
Monetary Fund which commenced in April 1984. It 
aimed to recover the time lost in implementing 
structural adjustment over the previous two years. At 
the same time and in recognition of the increasing debt 
burden the emphasis which had been placed in the past 
on capital inflows as the engine of growth was 
abandoned and autonomous means would need to be 
found to stimulate domestic growth. Specific targets 
were set in the agreement in relation to reducing the 
central government deficit, achieving an overall balance 
of payments surplus and reducing the rate of credit 
creation.
In support of these measures attention was 
given to exchange rate policy in an attempt to improve 
export competitiveness and reduce the degree of policy 
uncertainty in the economy. A floating band 
arrangement had been instituted in November 1983, at 
which time the dual rate was unified and the official 
rate moved from J$ 1.78 per US$ to $4.3. During the 
period November 1993-1994 the rate fluctuated 
between 4 .0  - 4.3 per US dollar. In November 1984 a 
free float was instituted and the rate depreciated to J$ 
6.1. The mechanism of floating together with various
modifications, in effect a managed float, was to 
continue until 1989 during which time the rate 
appreciated and was stabilized at J$5.5.
For the period 1984-1988 the external 
environment was propitious for Jamaica. Global growth 
resumed and with it global demand, oil prices fell and 
the bauxite alumina industry gained a fillip from the 
combined effects of both factors. Domestic interest 
rates were moved to positive levels and net private 
capital inflows resumed. This combination of external 
circumstances and domestic policies ensured that by 
1988 the external current account had substantially 
achieved balance, compared to a deficit of 15 per cent 
of product in 1985.
Some progress was also made on the fiscal 
account, bearing in mind the complicating effect of the 
growing debt burden, itself exacerbated by high 
international interest rates. A fiscal deficit equivalent to 
20 per cent of product in 1983 declined to just over 6.5 
per cent on average for the years 1984-1987, before 
mushrooming to 14 per cent under the burden of 
repairing hurricane damage in 1988. Accordingly, the 
rate of growth of the debt moderated to an average 
growth of less than 7 per cent per annum for the years 
1984-1988, a marked contrast to the average of 19 per 
cent per annum, in the preceding three-year period 
between 1980-1983. By the end of 1988 the debt had 
moderated, from a high of 178 per cent of product in 
1985, to about 115 per cent of GDP and 178 per cent 
of exports. Despite this adjustment, after a period of 
contraction in 1985-1986, growth resumed in 1987 and 
has been sustained until 1992.
Adjustment with accelerating liberalization
What had been a slow though steady process 
of adjustment was cut short by a sharp shock to the 
economy in the form of hurricane Gilbert, which struck 
the island in the third quarter of 1988. Damage to 
housing was enormous, affecting 55 per cent of 
housing stock. In the eastern portion of the island 20 
per cent of houses were totally destroyed. 
Infrastructure, mainly electricity, water and roads, was 
also badly damaged and productive activities were 
severely disrupted. In agriculture the banana industry 
was almost wiped out and other tree crops severely 
damaged. Manufacturing was disrupted by inoperative 
infrastructure. Hotels were damaged and flooded and 
the steady growth of tourism received a setback. All 
these effects were to have an adverse impact on the 
external account in 1989.
The rebuilding effort made enormous demands 
on credit and public spending, which the external 
account, despite reinsurance inflows, was unable to 
sustain in the light of weakened foreign exchange 
earning capacity. Exchange rate policy, despite various 
unsuccessful attempts to make it more transparent, was 
still discretionary. While depreciation took place 
during the year, it was not sufficiently responsive to 
the severe shock of the hurricane. The matter was 
exacerbated by currency speculation, as economic 
agents doubted the credibility of the existing rates. At 
this point the managed auction was suspended, in effect 
fixing the exchange rate. Concomitantly, monetary 
policy was tightened in late 1989, but by this time 
there was significant deviation from plan targets. The 
growth rate of GDP in 1989 mirrored the increase in 
the external current deficit, 6.5 per cent GDP growth, 
with an erosion of the current account from balance to 
a deficit equivalent to 6.5 per cent of product. The 
fiscal deficit, while declining from the huge increase of 
the previous year, remained above target at 5.4  per 
cent of GDP.
Policy objectives for fiscal year 1990/1991 
were determined in conjunction with a new Standby 
Agreement, to cover the period January 1990-March 
1991. These policies called for the fiscal deficit to be 
reduced to 4.8 per cent of GDP, continuation of 
restrictive monetary policies, improvement in the 
reserves and phased reduction in external payments 
arrears. The programme was suspended after three 
months as preliminary results were unsatisfactory. New 
policies were adopted in the third quarter of 1990, 
which would retain the basic objectives of stabilization 
but would accelerate the liberalization process in order 
to facilitate economic transformation. This round of 
liberalization included facilities which allowed residents 
and non-residents to hold foreign exchange accounts. 
Banks were allowed to trade freely in foreign 
exchange, the official rate being a composite of the 
market exchange rates charged by the various 
commercial banks. Savings rates were also deregulated, 
banks being authorized to set their own rates.
The outcome of these policies was mixed, due 
in part to a troubled external environment, sparked by 
the Gulf hostilities leading to oil price instability and 
weakening economic performance in the industrial 
countries. Nevertheless, product grew by 4.8 per cent 
although at the cost of widening the external current 
deficit, mainly caused by weak tourism growth. The 
capital account improved, private capital flows 
increasing, because of greater confidence in the
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economy and reserves increased. The fiscal deficit, 
however, worsened by about 0.5 per cent to over 6 per 
cent of product, though if  interest and amortisation 
charges on the debt were excluded a surplus of over 15 
per cent of product would be achieved. Inflation 
increased, mainly because of depreciation in the 
exchange rate with the introduction of the new inter 
bank foreign exchange system, but also because of the 
deregulation of the energy market and the pass-through 
of all increases to the consumer, following instabilities 
in the petroleum market.
Fiscal year 1991-1992 saw a continuation of 
stabilization policies. Price controls were by now 
almost completely removed, remaining only on 
transportation, sugar and kerosene. Subsidies continued 
to be reduced and the privatization programme 
advanced. New taxation measures were also introduced 
in the form of a General Consumption Tax partly 
compensating for trade taxes reduced due to 
implementation of the Common External Tariff. The 
year was also notable for a full liberalization of foreign 
exchange policies, which allowed the holding of foreign 
exchange both locally and abroad. This phase of the 
liberalization was advanced by six months to September 
1991, despite difficulties experienced earlier in the year 
with containing the money supply. Efforts to stimulate 
the economy early in the year led to the removal of 
credit restrictions, adjustments to the liquid assets ratio 
and reduction of interest rates. Some of these policies 
had subsequently to be reversed as increased credit was 
channelled into currency speculation. The intended 
effect, to increase private sector investment, was not 
achieved.
Product grew on average by about 2.5 per cent 
for the period 1990-1992. The current deficit on the 
balance of payments contracted between 1990-1991 and 
achieved a small surplus in 1992. The external debt 
contracted by over 11 per cent between 1990-1992. 
Fiscal policy needed to take a more conservative stance 
in the face of liberalization, the continuing debt burden 
and the need to make provision for Central Bank 
losses. If amortization costs were excluded a surplus of 
2.5 per cent of product was achieved in 1991 and this 
increased to the equivalent of 2.9  per cent in 1992. The 
accelerated process of liberalization and insufficient 
policy coordination, however, took its toll in 
diminished stability, inflation increasing progressively 
from just over 8 per cent in 1988 to over 77 per cent 
in 1992.
Reflection on the economic policies and
performance of the period 1981-1991 leaves one with 
some conclusions. The phase of adjustment with 
growth seems to have been misguided. Capital inflows 
did not significantly increase direct investment, and 
even had increased exportables been forthcoming they 
would need to have been sufficiently competitive to win 
market share in a declining global market. This would 
have been difficult at current levels of competitiveness. 
The result of increased inflows was increased
consumption and with it the external debt.
The second phase, o f orthodox adjustment, 
was fairly successful with appropriate polices being 
applied in conjunction with a conducive external 
environment. Exchange rate policy was improved and 
though later weakened by managed floating did not 
become significantly dysfunctional in the context of 
buoyant global demand. It was, however, inadequate 
to respond to a major shock, such as that delivered by 
hurricane Hugo.
The third phase, beginning with a new
administration, perhaps understandably, manifested 
some policy uncertainty in the face of intense exchange 
rate pressures following the hurricane. Its first reaction 
was to devalue and then fix the exchange rate,
presumably in the hope of establishing market stability.
Within a year, when it was clear that the 
objective was not being achieved, this policy was 
reversed to be replaced with a strong commitment to 
liberalization, both of the exchange rate and the 
administrative arrangements governing the holding of 
foreign exchange by nationals. The price as well as the 
suppressed demand for foreign exchange were
unleashed simultaneously. While this was in itself a 
prescription for a fairly rapid depreciation, it was 
facilitated by a rapid increase in credit thereafter. The 
failure to contain credit had adverse consequences for 
the exchange rate, the rate of inflation, and
liberalization policies as a whole. It may have sent a 
confused signal to other countries of the region 
searching for the appropriate policy instruments.
It is clear that liberalization of the foreign 
account should await the establishment of some balance 
in the economy, at the least in the fiscal account. In 
this case, liberalization may have been adopted to 
provide incentives to exportables thus facilitating 
structural change and to remove some politically 
controversial policy tools from political discretion.
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Trinidad and Tobago
Figure 19 
Trinidad and Tobago
Growth of red GDP
At the beginning of the 1980s the economy of 
Trinidad and Tobago was riding on the crest of the oil 
boom, which began in 1973. The impact of the twin oil 
price windfalls, which provided strong positive 
impulses to government revenues and to the balance of 
payments, fuelled greatly increased government 
activity. This permitted the near doubling in the rate of 
growth of product, from 3.1 per cent per annum on 
average for the period 1965-1973, to 5.8  per cent per 
annum on average for the period 1973-1983.
In fact 1980 constituted the peak of the oil 
boom, as measured by the export earnings from 
mineral fuels, since the price rises compensated up to 
then for output which peaked in 1978. The adjustment
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task faced by Trinidad and Tobago in the 1980s was, 
therefore, to manage the contraction of public sector 
activity in line with the steady decline of oil revenues 
and to stimulate alternative forms of wealth in the 
private sector.
By the end of the decade the public finances 
had achieved some measure of adjustment to reduced 
inflows from the petroleum sector, though the task of 
changing the structure of expenditure away from 
recurrent and towards capital spending was proving to 
be intractable. More telling, however, was the inability 
of the policies pursued to bring forth new sources of 
dynamism to re-energise growth and reabsorb idle 
resources, especially unemployed labour.
The economy manifested two distinct phases 
over the decade. In the first phase, the aftermath of 
the second oil boom from 1980-1982, output increased 
by almost 20 per cent, based essentially on increased 
petroleum earnings and possible expansionary fiscal 
policies. By 1982 expansion was achieved by incurring 
deficits, in the fiscal account of 12 per cent of product 
and in the external current account of 8 per cent of 
product.
The second phase, from 1983 to the present, 
was one of a cumulative contraction of real product by 
33 per cent. In this phase fiscal policy was mixed, 
initially continuing the expansionary policies of the past 
but as this started a rapid erosion of the reserves, 
adjustment measures became necessary and were 
initiated after 1983. Weak growth was achieved in 
1991 but this was spurred by a slight recovery in 
petroleum prices and economic contraction was 
resumed for the period 1992-1993.
Expansionary adjustment?
Initial warning signals that the petroleum 
dynamo was losing its momentum had appeared in 
1978 as output started to decrease. These were ignored 
as prices jumped for the second time in 1979-1980. 
The increased inflows were sufficient to finance new 
bursts o f government spending, which increased 
product by 16 per cent for the period 1980-1981 while 
at the same time permitting fiscal and balance of 
payments surpluses and substantial increases in 
reserves.
A second warning signal was provided in 1982 
as export earnings began to decline. This was, 
however, treated as a temporary fall in prices and 
attempts were made to use domestic spending to sustain 
growth in the fece of a fell-off in export earnings. 
Accordingly, the spending momentum, which got 
underway in 1980, accelerated, evidenced by the feet 
that government spending, which averaged about 32 per 
cent of product in the period 1979-1980, grew rapidly 
thereafter, being equivalent to one half of GDP by
1982. In that year current spending grew by 70 per 
cent, the rise being attributable mainly to increased 
public sector wages and salaries which grew by 119 per 
cent and transfers and subsidies which grew by 50 per 
cent. Within a year a fiscal surplus equivalent to 2.6 
per cent of GDP in 1981 was transformed into a deficit 
equivalent to 12 per cent of GDP in 1982 and a current 
external surplus equivalent to over 5 per cent of
product went into deficit equivalent to over 8 per cent 
of product. A rapid erosion of the reserves also began.
The phase of economic contraction
While high levels of government activity were 
sufficient to push up GDP in 1982, similar levels of 
activity were unable to repeat the trick in 1983, product 
felling precipitously by over 10 per cent. Although 
government expenditure was somewhat curtailed, the 
trend of rapidly increasing revenues was also reversed 
for the first time since the oil boom began, so that the 
large fiscal deficit remained substantially unchanged. 
The external current deficit widened further, to 13 per 
cent of product as export earnings continued to fell. As 
a consequence, the economy suffered a further 
haemorrhaging of its foreign reserves which fell by 
almost fourfold over the previous year. The year 1983 
marked the beginning of a period of steady decline of 
the economy of Trinidad and Tobago which continued 
until 1989.
Adjustm ent m easures were applied  
progressively between 1983-1985 in the form of 
controls on government spending, mainly investment 
spending, and foreign exchange rationing to control 
merchandise imports and foreign travel. Subsidies to 
public enterprises were also brought under greater 
scrutiny. These measures were effective, with the 
fiscal deficit felling from over 12 per cent of product 
in 1982 to 5.2 per cent in 1985. Similarly the policies 
relating to the balance of payments, although creating 
suppressed demand in the economy brought the deficit 
from 12.9 per cent in 1983 to 1.1 per cent in 1985. 
These policies, however, also brought with them an 
increase in unemployment and a further erosion in the 
reserves.
A renewed phase of adjustment became 
necessary by the end of 1985, however, for the oil 
prices were about to begin a precipitous fell. This was 
illustrated by the price index, felling to 48 by 1986 
compared with the base year of 1980. Stronger 
adjustment measures were adopted, including a 
devaluation of the currency by 50 per cent, the new 
rate covering three quarters of imports but excluding 
some essential foods, medicines and educational items. 
In view of the oil price decrease which was to follow, 
these measures were hardly sufficient to restore 
equilibrium in the external account. As a result, further 
import restrictions were applied. Despite these 
measures, the external deficit widened again to 9 per 
cent. On the fiscal side the deficit also widened
42
slightly, although the need for fiscal caution remained. 
The reserves fell twice as fast as in the previous year.
By the end of 1986 a new administration came 
to power, and with it further policy changes were 
initiated. Exchange rates were unified in early 1987 
and a further devaluation of 18 per cent took effect in 
August of 1988. Efforts were redoubled to establish 
fiscal balance by increasing revenues and reforming the 
public sector. Tax revenues continued the precipitous 
fell which started in 1982 and this trend was not 
reversed until 1989. Reform of the public sector was 
also a slow and divisive process. Initial efforts to 
contract the size of the public sector met with 
resistance from those affected, while the alternative 
strategy o f containing its cost by reducing emoluments 
paid to public servants was eventually to be frustrated 
by the courts. Nevertheless the fiscal balance was 
contained to the same level as the year before i.e., just 
under 6 per cent of GDP in 1987 and it fell steadily 
thereafter, and is expected to record a small surplus in 
1993.
The extent of the fiscal correction was 
demonstrated by the feet that government revenues 
averaged a feirly steady 35 per cent of GDP for the 
period 1973-1987. This fell subsequently to average
29.6 per cent between 1988-1992. The magnitude of 
the revenue decline needs also to be seen in the context 
of concomitant decline in real GDP. The decline would 
have been even greater had attempts not been made to 
compensate for significant declines in petroleum 
revenue by increasing other forms of taxation.
During the period 1976-1985, expenditures 
grew faster than GDP, to peak in that year at 39 per 
cent of GDP. They fell subsequently to average about 
33 per cent for the period 1988-1992. For 1993 a small 
surplus was projected with income and expenditure at 
about 28 per cent of GDP. Wages to central 
government workers declined from a peak of 15 per 
cent o f GDP in 1986 to just over 10 per cent in 1993. 
In the case of expenditures there was evidence of much 
effort to adjust to the contracting economy. Yet the 
burden of adjustment was put on capital spending. On 
average for the period 1989-1992, recurrent
expenditures accounted for over 90 per cent of all 
expenditures. In 1993 it was over 94 per cent, which 
meant that less than 6 per cent of product was available 
to reorient the economy and facilitate economic activity 
or provide new directions in human resources 
development.
Reduced revenue inflows to the public sector 
required a reassessment of the role of the State, and the 
divestment or closure of loss-making public enterprises. 
Concomitant with the contraction of State activity was 
the need to formulate policies to encourage increased 
activity in the private sector. Support from the IMF in 
1989 and from the World Bank in 1990 provided 
funding for a revised tax system and public sector 
reform. Income tax rates were simplified and 
supplemented by consumption taxes in the form of a 
value added tax.
The external current deficit which was 9 per 
cent of product in 1986 fell steadily in the fece of 
stringent fiscal and latterly, monetary policy to achieve 
a small surplus by 1992. Reserves continued to fell, 
though this was progressively reduced from a decline 
of US$722 million in 1986 to record moderate 
surpluses in 1989-1990, although the reserves were 
further depleted in 1991-1992.
Policy attention was also directed to the 
external sector, to increase its competitiveness and to 
reorient resources toward foreign exchange earning 
activities. A major aspect of this thrust was the 
aforementioned greater willingness to use of exchange 
rate policies for the purpose. This was also 
supplemented by a progressive deregulation of the 
external regulations with regard to imports and 
payments mechanisms so as to gradually expose local 
producers to external competition.
Exchange rate pressures increased in the 
period leading up to and just after the elections at the 
end of 1991. A new administration came to power also 
feeing increased pressures to expand public 
expenditure. The immediate policy response was to 
tighten domestic credit policies and increase direct 
taxes. After a period of consolidation, in which the 
fiscal account was brought into approximate balance, 
the exchange rate was deregulated through the 
mechanism of a managed float, commencing in April
1993. The rate went from the prevailing fixed rate of 
4.25 to 5.75 and has remained relatively stable up to 
the time of writing.
The period under review witnessed severe 
economic contraction, product felling by one third 
between 1983-1993. Unemployment rose from about 10 
per cent in 1982 to peak at 22 per cent in 1989, felling 
to 20 per cent in 1992. This level of contraction also 
had repercussions for the the financial system.
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PRIVATIZATION - POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE
The current focus on privatization springs 
from a number of diverse elements, which are both 
normative and practical. At one level it might be seen 
as a reaction to the policy of nationalization which was 
in vogue in the 1970s. But at a more practical level it 
is also being driven by severely constrained fiscal 
budgets. For the purposes of this discussion, 
privatization will be used in its broadest sense, to 
encompass all those actions used to transfer assets and 
influence from the public to the private sector. It will 
include divestment in its various forms as well as 
liberalization policies intended to improve the 
functioning of the market.
At the level of concepts, the debate is 
dominated by differing perceptions about the 
appropriate role of the State in directly productive 
activities. Arguments relating to efficiency vs. equity 
are often exchanged, as are discussions juxtaposing 
individualism and individual liberty to collectivism and 
group action. Various arguments are proffered to 
emphasize the efficiency and impersonality of the 
market on one hand, as opposed to the pressures of 
special interest groups upon, and the lack of 
appropriate information available to, the public sector 
to cast doubt on its competence in this sphere of action. 
The proponents of State intervention point to the 
frequency of market failure and the inability of the 
market to deal with questions of equity. They inveigh 
that markets are likely to be imperfect in small 
developing countries. Proponents of the market respond 
that market imperfections often result from policies of 
closure or excess protectionism and that there are more 
direct ways of dealing with externalities or of securing 
equity.
In effect, the debate relates to whether market 
or policy failure is most pervasive and whether the 
market is competent to judge the scope and pace of a 
range of normative issues. These differing viewpoints 
are perennial and ebb and flow throughout time as one 
side comes into fashion and the other side loses it.
In the context of the recently independent 
Caribbean, new elites came to power imbued with the 
belief that development had been severely hampered by 
former leaders and their private agents, who were more 
concerned with development in the colonial métropole 
than in the region itself. Accordingly, it was believed
that after Independence, development would follow if  
the new nationalist elites had the necessary 
commitment to the task of local development and 
possessed sufficient control over the means of 
production to achieve it. Since this was a commonly 
accepted view, in the aftermath of decolonization it was 
considered logical that control of the commanding 
heights of the economy should be entrusted to these 
new political elites. Such considerations were present 
in the policy stances adopted by Guyana, Grenada 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, although different 
rationale were advanced to justify intervention.
A number of practical considerations also 
guided the public sector in intervening in directly 
productive activities. Intervention was defended where 
the private sector was reluctant or too weak to engage 
in activities deemed to be necessary for development. 
Acquisitions were made, sometimes reluctantly, of 
enterprises in danger of failure, so as to maintain 
foreign exchange earning capacity and protect jobs. 
This was evident in Jamaica in the mid-1970s, where 
a number of hotels, in danger of closure, were acquired 
by government. In the Dominican Republic a number 
of enterprises, formerly owned by the dictator Rafael 
Trujillo, were ceded to the State upon his ouster, since 
public funds were said to have been involved in their 
operation. In Trinidad and Tobago, a number of public 
enterprises were spawned in an effort to invest 
petroleum windfalls, accruing to the State, in 
productive downstream enterprises. Others facing 
closure were also acquired.
Similarly, privatization was adopted for the 
practical reasons of establishing better fiscal balance 
and reducing the external debt burden. The cost of 
acquiring or creating major national assets had often 
been a severe burden on the public purse. The 
subsequent failure of many of these State acquisitions 
to achieve or maintain viability continued to erode the 
public finances long after a private entity would have 
gone into bankruptcy or achieved viability. Action was 
often delayed by public debate and the lobby of special 
interest groups. Whatever the merits of the contending 
views, the debate tended to create policy uncertainty 
and induce paralysis in adopting remedial measures. In 
the interim the cost of delay was paid in increasing 
local and foreign public debt so that often the choice 
became either divestment or closure.
In the Dominican Republic, the portfolio of 
public enterprises came about almost by accident. With 
the exception of public utilities which, as in most other 
countries, were State-owned, many of the State 
enterprises came about by nationalizing the assets of 
the Trujillo estate in 1961 at which time they were 
deemed to be the national patrimony. Currently, the 
State enterprises consist of the Dominican Electricity 
Corporation (CDE), the State Enterprise Corporation 
(CORDE), the State Sugar Council (CEA), the price 
stabilization institute and a number of other small 
enterprises.
The Dominican Electric Company (CDE) was 
a State monopoly which controlled the main generating 
plants and was the sole retailer of energy to the private 
sector. It was not the sole producer, since private 
parties were increasingly producing for their own use, 
but up to the end of 1989, when the law was changed, 
their surpluses could only be sold to CDE. Despite the 
change in the law no significant increase in electricity 
generation has been forthcoming from the private 
sector, in part because of an inadequate regulatory 
framework.
The CDE ran into serious cash flow problems 
in 1974, since it was dependent upon imported oil for 
75 per cent of its electricity generation and at the same 
time suffered from a rigid tariff policy, rates remaining 
unchanged between 1955-1979. Additionally, the 
corporation suffered from poor generating efficiency 
and high distributional losses, because of inadequate 
investment and maintenance, large scale theft and 
underbilling and excess employment. By 1980 the 
losses of CDE were equivalent to 0.9  per cent of GDP 
and waste from the aforementioned inefficiencies was 
estimated at almost US$50 million annually. This was 
to grow rapidly to over US$90 million by 1982.
As outages became more frequent, private 
producers increased their installed capacity and invested 
in standby generators for emergency use. By 1991 it 
was estimated that the CDE system accounted for less 
than 60 per cent of installed capacity, private producers 
for their own use almost 30 per cent, while the sugar 
and bauxite companies accounted for the rest. In that 
year only 40 per cent of the population had access to 
electricity and the demand for industrial purposes was 
expected to increase rapidly.
Efforts are currently underway to put the CDE 
on a better financial footing, through improved 
management and increased tariffs. Increased generating
capacity is being put into place and the distribution 
network is being rehabilitated. The deficit has declined 
to 0.1 per cent of GDP. CDE does not, however, have 
access to sufficient resources to meet the full needs of 
the country but privatization in part or in total is being 
inhibited by an inadequate regulatory framework for 
the industry. The issue of a regulatory framework is, 
however, relevant to all monopolies or near 
monopolies, whether public or private.
The Dominican Corporation for State 
Enterprises (CORDE) was formed in 1966 as the 
umbrella oiganization to administer the non-sugar 
enterprises of the Trujillo portfolio. It was subsequently 
expanded to include other activities. By 1987 the 
portfolio of CORDE included the national airline, two 
mines, an insurance company, a car dealership, a real 
estate business and 17 manufacturing enterprises. These 
produced cement, glass, paper, vegetable oils, shoes, 
tobacco, chocolate, nails, sacks and ropes, textiles, 
paints, milled grains, leather and car batteries. It 
included salt mines and refineries and marble and 
plaster mines. Previously it had also administered a 
hotel, hardware stores and a disco*0.
In the 22 years for which data are available 
CORDE has recorded a deficit in 17 years. While 
CORDE is justified by the argument that it performs a 
welfare function, it has in fact been sustained by 
taxpayers. Various efforts have been made to correct 
the inefficiencies in the CORDE group of companies, 
notably in 1982 where excess employment was 
estimated to be 20-25 per cent. It was also proposed to 
employ a consulting firm to decide which of the 
CORDE portfolio should be privatized. No action was 
taken on the question of privatization and this was 
resisted until 1993, when an official statement was 
made to the effect that some CORDE enterprises would 
be considered for privatization. After 1982 some 
progress was made toward returning CORDE to 
viability, profits being recorded between 1983-1985, 
but losses have been the norm since. Subsequently 
numerous cases of fraud have been unearthed.
The State Sugar Council (CEA) was created to 
administer the Trujillo sugar holdings, which up to 
1986 represented 55 per cent of the total land area 
devoted to sugar production in the Dominican 
Republic. The CEA which had been consistently 
profitable and a major contributor to public savings, 
averaging over 2 per cent of GDP for the years 1977- 
1979, became a net dissaver in 1980. This deficit 
increased to 1.2 per cent of GDP in 1982.
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As prices on the world market fell, other less 
favourable aspects of the CEA came to the fore. These 
included high prices paid for sugarcane from non-CEA 
producers, high transport costs, and low (controlled) 
domestic prices. Sugar production overall continued to 
fell throughout the 1980s, in part because of the 
reduced preferential quota to the United States, which 
was 500,000 tons in 1982, and declining world market 
prices. The State sugar sector suffered even greater 
shocks, however, being hampered by inefficiency in its 
operations. A number of social demands were also 
being made of it, so that it was unable to adjust to the 
rapidly changing global market. The CEA, therefore, 
continued to demand transfers averaging about 0.7 per 
cent of GDP from 1980 until 1991, the last year for 
which data are available.
A constellation of other enterprises cluster 
under the rubric of other small enterprises. They 
comprise the Port Authority, Agricultural Bank, 
Airport Commission, Water and Sewerage, Industrial 
Development Corporation, National Water Institute, 
and the Cooperative Development and Credit Institute.
Most of the nationalized public enterprises 
were initially profitable, but this was slowly eroded as 
they were asked to provide subsidies to various groups 
and management was chosen for reasons other than for 
their managerial qualities. In general the few profitable
Figure 23
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enterprises were decapitalized to subsidize the many 
unprofitable ones, to provide product to govemmentally 
favoured projects or to provide transfers to the 
Presidential Fund. Many enterprises suffered from 
inadequate maintenance and became insolvent. They 
were either closed as a result, or sold. In feet these 
cases constituted the few concrete instances of 
privatization.
Savings of the public sector enterprises as a 
whole became negative in 1979 and the deficit grew to 
3.8 per cent of GDP by 1980. Deficits exceeding 0.5  
per cent of product were incurred in all years in the 
1980s. Despite these huge losses there was no sustained 
effort for the rehabilitation, rationalization or 
privatization of public sector enterprises. The possible 
reasons suggested11 for this inaction were: 1) the firms 
met political needs and their sale would have caused 
unemployment and tighter accounting controls; 2) they 
were able to provide cross-subsidies to the weaker 
enterprises, thus sustaining employment in them; and,
3) careful scrutiny would make explicit their losses, 
and expose the failure of government to operate them 
efficiently, evidence which was concealed by transfers. 
In the case of the sugar industry, privatization was 
linked to the controversial question of land reform, 
while CDE, the electricity corporation, was so large 
that foreign participation, a politically sensitive 
solution, might be necessary to achieve privatization.
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In Guyana the public sector dominated the 
economy from the early 1970s, accounting for more 
than 50 per cent of national investment from 1971. 
This share continued to increase throughout the decade 
resting at 81 per cent in 1978. The relative shares of 
investment and credit during the 1980s are illustrated 
at Figures 23 and 24. The public sector was also the 
major creditor, the major export earner, the major 
employer and accounted for the major share of Gross 
Domestic Product. By 1988, which marked the peak of 
its power before public policy changed, the public 
sector employed 60 per cent of the work force, 
accounted for 70 per cent of GDP and 85 per cent of 
the exports12. Under comprehensive administrative 
controls many preferences were accorded to the State 
sector, including access to foreign exchange, credit 
including preferential interest rates and agricultural 
inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides and so on. Despite 
this apparent preeminent position, production and 
export earnings were declining rapidly and many 
government enterprises incurred significant losses, 
requiring massive transfers from the national budget as 
outlined in the previous section.
This economic power was concentrated in 
enterprises felling within two holding companies. 
BIDCO dealt with the mining sector construction and 
trade. The remaining companies fell within the ambit 
of the Guyana State Corporation, GUYSTAC, which 
included the sugar industry, rice marketing, timber 
milling, fishing, textiles, electricity generation, 
telecommunications and air transport. Mining, sugar 
and rice marketing were the major sectors, accounting 
for about half of the operating revenues. The financial 
difficulties of the State monopolies in these sectors 
accounted for the major burden on the budget. 
Nevertheless, the output of most enterprises had been 
declining and capacity utilization of the public 
enterprises was estimated to average about 35 per cent. 
Output sometimes was as low as 20 per cent of 
capacity. Measures were proposed by 1984 to try to 
improve the efficiency of public sector enterprises, by 
restructuring GUYSTAC and the Guyana Rice Board 
and by financial restructuring of the Guymine. This 
required rehabilitating some factories and applying 
more representative prices where outputs were 
underpriced to the public. Yet these measures were 
unable to contain the fiscal haemorrhage or to 
significantly improve output. Enterprises that had 
become accustomed to privileged positions in the 
economy seemed incapable of internally carrying out 
the drastic measures needed to ensure competitiveness 
and secure increased output.
Many impediments feced by these enterprises 
were macroeconomic in nature and affected private 
enterprises and the society as a whole. Any meaningful 
solution to the plight of the public enterprises would 
have required a combination of micro- and 
macroeconomic measures for the sectors to become 
viable. These policies would need also to be 
sufficiently credible so that they would not be 
perceived to be reversible on political whim.
A more comprehensive programme of 
macroeconomic reforms was initiated with the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) announced in 
mid-1988 and underpinned by the IMF. The ERP also 
introduced the issue of privatization. The term was 
broadly defined to include divestment, either in whole 
as going concerns or by sale of the assets of the 
various entities. It also included reaching management 
contracts of a hands-off nature, to remove elements of 
political control and to improve performance prior to 
divestment and it included joint ventures and lease 
agreements.
A comprehensive mechanism was established, 
in the Public Corporations Secretariat, to oversee the 
divestment process. This included a Divestment Unit 
that did operational tasks based on the directions of the 
Divestment Policy Group. The latter was chaired by 
the President, and included the Ministers of Trade, 
Finance, Agriculture and Industry and took all major 
operational decisions, such as the acceptance of bids. 
The Divestment Unit also reported to Cabinet, through 
one of its subcommittees called the Monitoring 
Committee. This comprised an expanded membership 
of the divestment Policy Group, to include others, 
notably, the Governor of the Central Bank. The 
Monitoring Committee functioned as general policy 
maker for the divestment process.
A group o f 32 corporations operated under the 
Public Corporations Secretariat. Of these, 14 had been 
totally or partially privatized by October 1992. Despite 
the elaborate institutional mechanism for overseeing the 
privatization process, the two largest transactions, 
D e m e r a r a  W o o d s  L t d .  a n d  G u y a n a  
Telecommunications, were carried out without the 
involvement of the Public Corporations Secretariat.
Management contracts were negotiated for the 
Guyana Sugar Corporation and for the production 
activities of Guymine, in both cases as possible 
precursors to full or partial divestment. A joint venture 
arrangement was agreed with the Guyana
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Telecommunications Company, government retaining 
a minority 20 per cent to ensure that it had a 
monitoring capability in the operations of the company.
In the sugar sector, a management contract 
was entered with Booker Tate to take over the daily 
operations of GUYSUCO. The agreement provided 
initial success with steadily increasing sugar output, 
exports increasing by 35 per cent between 1989-1992. 
Considerable new investment will be needed to ensure 
continued output and this is not available from public 
sources so that private sector participation will need to 
be encouraged. Guyana has steadily lost its market 
share in the bauxite refractory market. This 
deterioration has been due in part to insufficient 
investment to upgrade depreciating plant and equipment 
also to deficient management. Attempts to entice the 
former owners of the nationalised mining operations to 
enter joint ventures with government have not been 
successful as they are wary of incurring the risk related 
to the considerable investment required.
Several problems arose regarding an accurate 
determination of the selling price for these enterprises. 
Given that many enterprises were not currently 
profitable and continued to drain resources, the 
pressures to divest were heightened while prospective 
purchasers were discouraged. This illustrated a major 
paradox of privatization, trying to sell unattractive or 
insolvent entities. The public tended to regard the 
process as opaque, secretive and difficult for them to 
evaluate, thus engendering suspicion. Some enterprises 
also lacked up-to-date audited accounts. Accordingly, 
there were some complaints that investors got national 
assets below their "market value," while others 
complained that the pace of divestment was too slow.
Prior to the election in 1992 the privatization 
process was subject to severe criticism by the then 
opposition party. This tended to buttress the suspicions 
of the public that some enterprises were being sold 
too cheaply. The political factor dampened the pace of 
the divestment process prior to the election. After the 
election there was a hiatus, since the change of 
government created a high level o f political uncertainty 
about the future of privatization and of the ERP as a 
whole.
These fears were partly laid to rest, once the 
privatization programme was resuscitated, within the 
framework of five principles. These were stated13 as, 
"open bidding and award procedures, fairly priced
sales, the offering of company shares to the public, 
buyer assurances to modernize and/or expand the 
enterprises acquired and consumer protection." The 
first task of the privatization committee was, however, 
to review all past sales, so that the momentum 
developed in previous years was lost.
Besides the dominant bauxite and sugar 
sectors, several public enterprises remain with 
decisions not yet taken as to whether, or how, they 
would be privatized. These included areas such as rice 
paddy and rice grading, engineering, the oil company, 
Guyana airways, the Guyana National Shipping 
Company, the national printers, Guyana Stores, 
packaging industries, newspapers and broadcasting and 
the liquor/distilling corporation. In total, government 
participation remained in 30 companies, including 
seven in the financial sector which accounted for over 
half the total financial assets.
Jamaica represented, perhaps, the most widely 
publicized case of divestment in the Caribbean. This 
was in part due to a clash of competing ideologies pre- 
and post 1980. In the former case, the policies were 
for a high level o f State participation, in the latter, post 
1980, a policy was adopted to reduce the role of the 
State since it was seen to have over-extended itself, 
with consequent detriment to the economy as a whole 
and specifically to the fiscal accounts and the debt. 
Yet too much should not be made of the ideological 
divide within the political parties as public sector 
growth was evident under both jurisdictions while 
privatization was pursued by both after 1980 and 1989, 
respectively.
A second reason for the Jamaican profile on 
this issue was the fact that it was an early starter with 
policies of privatization, such policies being enunciated 
in early 1981. Latterly, it has also extended the scope 
of privatization beyond that contemplated by most other 
countries in the region.
As a consequence of its longer experience, 
Jamaica also provided a better indication of the 
consequences of the policy and of the difficulties and 
limitations being encountered in the process of 
privatization. Since its approach mixed ideological and 
pragmatic considerations it also provided examples of 
inconsistency, i.e. efforts by government to acquire a 
major productive enterprise in the alumina sector in the 
mid-1980s, coexistent with a major divestment effort in 
other areas, such as tourism.
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State participation in the productive sectors 
was first mooted in the five-year Plan of 1963-1968. 
Initially, three sugar factories in danger of closure 
were acquired, and the Hotel Corporation of Jamaica 
formed to stimulate tourism development through hotel 
construction. It was, however, in the public utilities 
that most activity was focused, notably water and the 
formation of the Public Utilities Commission, to 
oversee the operations of the private electricity, 
telephone and public transport monopolies, after 
evaluating their operations and exposing some o f their 
measures for securing "supernormal profits", the 
electricity company was acquired in 1969, telephones 
in 1970 and public transport in 1974.
The period 1972-1980 saw redoubled efforts 
to increase State participation. The motivation was to 
stimulate growth and facilitate the redistribution of 
resultant benefits. State expansion was financed with 
the proceeds of a bauxite levy. This enabled the State 
to reacquire lands owned by foreign mineral 
companies; to expand the delivery of housing to low 
income groups; to develop State purchasing of bulk 
items and to increase its exposure in the media. A 
number of other acquisitions were undertaken in 
reaction to situations as they arose and were motivated 
by a desire to sustain activities that were in danger of 
closure, whether due to a lack o f business confidence 
in the prevailing government policies or in other cases 
of genuine insolvency. This was the case particularly 
in the tourist sector and in some retail distributive 
trades.
As a consequence of these developments, by 
1981 the Jamaican Government had a portfolio of 
investments which had grown haphazardly. It included 
bauxite, petroleum, cement, 75 per cent of Jamaica’s 
sugar output and 50 percent of hotel room capacity14. 
It also included activity in finance and a State Trading 
Company. Estimates of the quantum of such holdings 
vary. One estimate, by the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, is that State-owned enterprises numbered 400 
by 198013, though this number contracted to about 200 
by the end of the decade, consequent on closures and 
divestment. It has also been estimated that government 
participated in directly productive activities in 198 
companies, 81 per cent of which were wholly owned.
The main categories were: (a) agriculture, 51 
enterprises, 76 per cent of which were wholly owned; 
(b) bousing, three enterprises, two of which were 
wholly owned; (c) financing institutions, 43 in total, 
40 of which were wholly owned; (d) external trade,
three wholly owned; (e) tourism, 30 entities, 83 per 
cent wholly owned; (f) industry and commerce, 49 
entities, 84 per cent wholly owned; (g) public utilities, 
19 entities ranging from airlines, merchant shipping, 
telecommunications, etc, 11 of which were wholly 
owned; and, (h) media enterprises, three, all wholly 
owned.
A combination o f ideological and practical 
reasons surrounded the introduction of privatization in 
1981. A change of government stressed a greater role 
for the private sector. At the same time the adjustment 
programme, agreed with the IMF and World Bank, 
was designed to orient the economy towards export 
promotion rather than import substitution, balance the 
fiscal and external accounts, and to stimulate economic 
growth, with responsibility being placed on the private 
sector to provide the engine for such growth. In line 
with the declaration that government would provide a 
facilitating rather than direct participation in the 
productive sector, a number of the existing public 
sector enterprises were to be closed, others were 
earmarked for divestment to the private sector and the 
remainder were to be put on a sound financial basis.
As outlined in a foregoing section, adjustment 
efforts between 1981-1984 were tentative and 
ineffective. The divestment programme was similarly 
hampered, two enterprises being sold and the public 
transport system franchised to private operators 
between 1981-1985, under the auspices of the newly 
formed divestment committee. Yet the Agricultural 
Marketing Boards were transformed in function, some 
hotels had been leased and a start had been made to 
contract out municipal services which were not being 
effectively performed. The programme then lost 
momentum, which was not regained until the second 
more rigorous phase of adjustment commenced in 
1985.
In this phase, focus was placed on the fiscal 
imbalances and the need to service a growing debt. 
Given the importance of the major State-owned entities 
their reform became a priority. With an eye to fiscal 
performance, reforms transformed the operating 
balance of these entities from a deficit of 1 per cent of 
GDP in 1981 to a surplus of about 7 per cent of GDP 
by 1987. The emphasis was on making these entities 
profitable through cost recovery. Less concern was 
directed at efficiency. The focus instead was on 
reducing the backlog of investment but this had the 
effect of increased the portion of government 
guaranteed debt attributable to them.
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Renewed impetus was given to the 
privatization programme by a reconstituted divestment 
committee. The administrative arrangements for 
privatization differed somewhat from those adopted for 
phase one. There the Divestment Committee comprised 
a number of senior civil servants and businessmen, 
acting in an ad hoc manner. Pressure of their 
substantive responsibilities meant that sufficient policy 
attention was not available for privatization.
The new arrangements meant that while the 
Divestment Committee remained responsible for the 
overall process, responsibility for managing the 
divestment process on a day-to-day basis rested with 
the Privatization Secretariat, comprising officials of 
the National Investment Bank of Jamaica, (NIBJ), 
officials of the appropriate ministries and selected 
external consultants. This group was responsible for 
preparing the prospectus of the entity to be divested, 
negotiating with interested parties, recommending the 
selected applicant for cabinet approval and effecting the 
transfer once the sale had been approved. Nevertheless, 
the Divestment Committee remained only one of many 
sources of privatization, the National Hotels and 
Properties, the Factories Corporation and the 
Agricultural Development Corporation group of 
companies still having responsibility for the divestment 
of entities foiling within their purview. The Ministry of 
Public Utilities and Transport was also responsible for 
assigning deregulated bus routes. For the period 1985- 
1991, 39 of the enterprises listed were divested16, as 
well as other properties being used for agricultural and 
other forms of development.
A wide variety of mechanisms were used in 
the divestment process and included leases, placements 
on the Stock Exchange, share sales for unlisted entities 
and offers of shares to employees, while some of the 
assets of other entities were sold prior to their closure. 
While most sales were made through public offers, 
some government share holdings were also disposed of 
under private treaty. Other mechanisms were also used, 
such as placing two sugar companies under 
management contract, the closure of the national bus 
company while transferring its functions to private 
minibus operators, contracting out street cleaning and 
certain hospital services to private operators, 
privatization of the administrative and trading arm of 
the banana industry and partial divestment of two 
banks, one by public share offer, the other by public 
tender. The proceeds from privatization flowing into 
the NIBJ amounted to J$1256.4 million, and proceeds
to NHP amounted to J$882.2 million for the sale of 
hotels. This total of J$2138.6 million did not include 
annual lease payments or proceeds accruing to the other 
divesting entities.
The privatization exercise entered a second 
phase in 1991, coterminous with a renewed push by the 
government toward liberalization and in the context of 
a Fund/Bank programme for the period 1990-1991. 
This phase was initiated, after an initial hiatus, by a 
different administration to that which initiated phase 
one, so that the two major political parties had become 
committed to the privatization process and represented 
a further intensification of the programme to include 
electricity, railways, water, airport services and air 
transport. The importance of this development was that 
the debate on this issue was conducted on how best to 
achieve the goals of privatization rather than on 
whether to privatize or not.
Much of the impetus for privatization, 
nevertheless, continued to come from outside, from the 
aforementioned Bank and Fund programmes, as well as 
a belief that accelerated privatization would augur well 
for qualification for the Enterprise of the Americas 
Initiative. At the same time, a fairly broad measure of 
consensus by now existed within the country for it, in 
part because of a belief that the public sector had 
overextended itself, in part because it was seen to be a 
haven for non-viable entities, in part because of 
disenchantment with its actual performance and in part 
because of general acceptance of the success of phase 
one of the privatization programme.
Despite this general acceptance, some 
criticisms were voiced, so that phase two, in which 67 
entities were earmarked for privatization, was launched 
in the context of changed administrative arrangements. 
Attempts were made to centralize all divestments under 
the NIBJ, answerable to a Cabinet subcommittee 
chaired by the Prime Minister. Emphasis was also 
placed on a number of principles which were to govern 
the process. These included, public announcement of 
the entities to be privatized; market valuation to be 
used to determine the disposal price; arms length 
transactions with equal opportunity given to all, except 
where foreign exchange requirements were a feature of 
the transaction or where special arrangements were 
being made for employees; and public announcements 
would be made on the privatization of each entity. 
Essentially, these provisions were initiated to ensure 
greater transparency in the privatization process17.
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Phase two of the programme had divested 16 
public sector entities, up to the end of 199218. This 
took the form of lease o f assets; outright sale; sale of 
equipment, land or shares; or in one case, that of the 
former government printing office, the creation of an 
Employee Ownership Share Plan. The proceeds from 
these activities, amounted to J$ 1,062 million19.
In Trinidad and Tobago the State became 
widely involved in directly productive activity, 
following from policies enunciated in its Third Five 
Year Plan (1969-1973). This indicated that the State 
would take a heightened role in development, to create 
new job opportunities, to transform the economy and 
ensure overall national development. These objectives 
remained dormant until 1973, since the State lacked the 
resources to effect them. Subsequently, these goals 
were further amplified to stress three others; 
localization, that of facilitating the transfer of control 
of foreign holdings to locals; the developmental goal, 
that of facilitating the development of new local 
industries; and the goal o f rescuing jobs in private 
enterprises which were in danger of closure. Once 
resources permitted, public involvement was further 
justified in areas considered to be pioneering, where 
local expertise was not readily available and risk was 
deemed to be too high for the private sector. State 
involvement was also justified for the establishment of 
heavy industry, where large injections of venture 
capital or external loan financing were needed20.
In 1972 the government had share holdings in 
32 companies, with a book value of approximately TT$ 
60 million. The size and scope of government activity 
grew rapidly thereafter. By the end of 1986, the State 
held a portfolio of 166 enterprises with its share 
holdings valued at over TT$3953 million. This 
portfolio covered such activities as oil, gas, petro­
chemicals, asphalt, airlines, hotels, banking, insurance, 
sugar, mixed forming, fruit and meat processing, grain 
milling, maintenance and so on. Of these, many of  
which competed directly with the private sector, 37 
were wholly owned, 11 were majority owned, one was 
50 per cent owned, and 17 were minority holdings. At 
its peak in 1985, these enterprises employed over 
34,000 people. Overall, the public sector absorbed on 
average 47 per cent of all salaried employees over the 
period 1989-1991.
The involvement of the State was for larger 
than the nominal value of the holdings would suggest. 
Loans, advances and subventions were readily made 
available to public enterprises and it is estimated21 that
such assistance amounted to TT$5,800 million, between 
1979-1984. In 1987 alone TT$ 967 million, or almost 
20 per cent o f recurrent expenditure, was budgeted to 
cover operating debts and contingent liabilities relating 
to the State enterprises, many of which are dependent 
on such support for their continued existence22. 
Government transfers, mainly to public enterprises and 
public utilities, amounted to almost 10 per cent of GDP 
in 1991. The large State enterprises had also 
contributed a large portion of the external debt, 
accounting for about 65 per cent of it in 1987.
Whatever the theoretical or practical benefits 
which might accrue to the economy because of State 
involvement it was recognized that the State enterprises 
represented a severe and unsustainable burden on the 
public purse. Many public acquisitions intended to save 
jobs were not viable and had scant hope of ever 
achieving viability. Where the possibility of 
improvement existed the necessary capitalization, better 
management or modernization was not forthcoming.
Other reasons for declining viability were: (a) 
unwillingness to quantify the resources which would be 
needed to implement implicit social and political 
objectives, often evident in the pricing of public 
utilities, and evaluate them in the light of the 
opportunity costs of these resources; (b) an inability to 
set clear goals and objectives for the public enterprises 
and to adhere to them; (c) a lack of accountability; and 
(d) ineffective management.
Based on the past experience of existing public 
enterprises and the prevailing economic situation, the 
government decided to reduce the dominant role that 
the State had played in the economy between 1974 and 
198623. While these policies were implicitly followed 
after 1986, they were made explicit in the Macro 
Planning Framework 1989-1995. In 1987 the
Rampersad Committee was appointed to make 
recommendations for the rationalization o f the State 
sector. Internal initiatives toward privatization were 
subsequently buttressed, by an IMF standby agreement 
in 1989 and by a World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Loan in 1990, which included provisions for the reform 
of both the public enterprises and the public utilities.
The overall policy framework was modified to 
state that rather than engage in directly productive 
activities, government would seek to create an 
appropriate environment conducive to the operations of 
the private sector and to provide the necessary 
supporting infrastructure. It would also provide fiscal
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incentives to induce new ventures. Exceptions to the 
above would apply to enterprises deemed to be of 
national importance, either where the private sector 
could not initiate action on its own because of financial 
or technological reasons, or where a strategic industry 
needed to be controlled, in which case equity 
participation of the State would be limited to 50 per 
cent.
For existing public enterprises the following 
options were outlined: (a) reduce public participation 
where the potential existed for the enterprise to be 
viable; (b) close those operations which are not viable 
and whose continued operations could not be justified 
on social grounds; (c) rationalize those entities which 
were established to circumvent deficiencies in the 
public sector bureaucracy so as to make them more 
efficient and accountable; and, (d) restructure and make 
more efficient those enterprises deemed to be in the 
national interest. Where subsidies were necessary for 
a particular purpose, they would be quantified and the 
enterprise expected to operate on commercial criteria 
for the other areas of its operation. Mergers would be 
used where necessary to promote efficiency.
In summary, privatization was proposed where 
the initial objectives of State ownership had been 
fulfilled, where the need to promote a more balanced 
distribution o f ownership was deemed to be necessary, 
due to the government’s need for additional financial 
resources or to better allocate its financial resources, or 
where it was judged that an operation might be more 
efficiently carried out by the private sector.
The principles governing divestment were to 
take into account appropriate market conditions in 
determining the selling price, the need to further avoid 
the concentration of equity, the need to terminate 
government liabilities regarding future operations, and 
retention of controlling interest in enterprises deemed 
to be of strategic importance.
The Rampersad Committee proposed that all 
holdings in which the government had a minority share 
should be divested. Recommendations were made 
regarding 20 o f the remaining wholly owned or 
majority owned enterprises. Twelve were recommended
for divestment, six for liquidation, and in the case of 
the Solid Waste Company no action was to be taken. 
By the end of 1991 four firms were liquidated, one was 
leased and five were divested. The proceeds from these 
divestments amounted to US$6.8 million from public 
sale and US$84.9 from private sale to foreigners. The 
proceeds were used to retire public debt.
With the advent o f a new administration there 
was a hiatus in the divestment process and a review of 
existing policies completed by the first quarter of 
19932*. At that time 84 government companies were 
being examined, with firm decisions made with regard 
to 47 of them. The remaining 37 were still under 
review. Of the 47, it was decided to divest 28 of 
them25, 11 were in various stages of liquidation and 
four o f the remaining eight were to be restructured, 
with the remainder to be retained in the public sector.
A full range of options was used in the 
divestment process. In some cases shares were sold, in 
some instances preference being given to existing 
shareholders. In other cases mergers, in the banking 
and petroleum sectors were prescribed, or strategic 
alliances were proposed, in the case of the national 
airline, or a joint venture in the case of a Tobago hotel. 
In some cases assets would only be partially divested,
i.e. the Methanol Company. In the case of the 
financial sector where some entities were in financial 
difficulty mergers would be encouraged.
In general the pace of privatization was slow. 
The issue was on the political agenda since the early 
1970s, although not seriously considered until after the 
mid-1980s. Public ownership was accelerated in 
response to political disturbances in 1970. Politically 
emphasis was placed on achieving better ethnic balance 
and securing greater localization of assets and decision­
making. These rationale still remain. Many of the 
State owned enterprises, especially those in downstream 
petroleum activities, are large in relation to the capacity 
of domestic entrepreneurs to purchase or manage them 
so that divestment needs foreign participation. This has 
been secured in the case of ISCOTT and TSTT though 
government participation remains large. It might set a 
precedent for further activities although opposition to 
privatization remains.
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NOTES
1. This has prompted one writer to advocate that Caribbean policy makers should in future treat windfalls as 
temporary and adverse external shocks as permanent.
2. For example, the sugar industry which was examined in the Dominican Republic case was relevant to and had 
many parallels with, the sugar industries in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. All have suffered declines, 
in line with depressed global prices and reduced quotas, but the State-owned enterprises have been slower to adjust 
to these developments than their less constrained counterparts in the private sector. Privatisation has been, or is 
being considered in all instances, though the conclusions reached have differed. Similarly, with the electrical power 
industry. All in the recent past have been public sector monopolies. All have suffered decapitalization, as rates have 
not moved in line with costs, especially where they were dependent upon imported petroleum. All failed to keep 
up with demand, the consequent outages jeopardising economic development and reducing the quality o f  life.
3. The efficiency o f one or more public enterprise was improved from time to time, for instance in the Dominican 
Republic but the key to maintaining good performance over a broad front o f  entities over the long term seemed to 
elude most countries.
4. This group holds that public sector decision makers are rational maximizers o f self-interest, just as are private 
sector decision makers. However, rather than seeking profit they seek approval, by providing benefits for which 
revenues to finance them are not levied. The consequences are often inflated public sectors and growing deficits. 
See Buchanan, James; Tullock, Gordon: "The Calculus o f  Consent".
5. In Jamaica the PNP government, former advocates o f  State ownership as a means o f  reducing the control o f  
established oligarchies, now champions o f deregulation and the establishment of a more competitive economy for 
precisely the same reason. Adam, C.; Cavendish, W.; Mistry, P.; Adjusting Privatization : Op. cit.
6. This was evident in Jamaica where initially emphasis was put on leasing hotels rather than outright sale. Over 
time resistance to privatization itself softened. Experience with the lease agreements also revealed weaknesses in 
that method o f  privatization which tended to emphasise short-term profitability, to the detriment o f  longer-term 
capital investment. Similarly, there was initial resistance to total privatization o f the telecommunications sector, 
which was considered to be strategic. Yet as the State was unable to allocate the necessary financial and technical 
resources for upgrading, it progressively reduced its share from 83 per cent to 20 per cent over a three-year period.
7. Danns, D. - Guyana’s Debt Problem. Paper presented to the 19th Regional Programme for Monetary Studies, 
November 1987.
8  . Jefferson, Owen. Some aspects o f Jamaica’s External Debt, Bank o f Jamaica, January 1988.
9. Ibid.
10. Thoumi, Francisco. "Privatization in the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago". From "Privatization 
o f  Public Enterprises in Latin America"; Ed. William Glade.
11. Thoumi, Francisco, op. cit.
12. Marshall, Elsa R. Privatisation o f Public Enterprises, Policies, Methods and Procedures. Bank o f Guyana.
13. Statement o f  the Minister o f  Finance in Washington February 1993. The Journal o f  Commerce, February 11,
1993.
1 4  . Adam, C. Cavendish, W.; Mistry, P.; Adjusting Privatization P 110-112.
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15. Allen, Mary. "Privatization and monetary developments in Jamaica". Presented to the 23rd annual conference 
o f  the Regional Programme o f Monetary Studies, November 1991.
16. Ibid.
17. It has also been suggested that the first phase o f privatization focused simply on the process o f  changing 
ownership. The second phase focused on putting the programme in the context o f  an overall private sector 
development strategy , which included appropriate regulatory framework, or deregulation where appropriate, which 
had as its goal a more competitive domestic economy. Adam, C.; Cavendish, W.; Mistry, P.; Adjusting 
Privatization : Op. cit.
18. Source: PIOJ; Economic and Social Survey o f Jamaica 1991, 1992.
19. Ibid. •
20. Source: National Planning Commission of Trinidad and Tobago; "Medium term Macro Planning Framework 
1989-1995".
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Yet even during this period the positions held on State ownership were not doctrinaire. The 1972 "White Paper 
on Public Sector Participation", as well as the Bruce Committee, convened to "make recommendations on the 
divestment o f shares in public enterprises", recognized the option o f divestment. Source: Sergant, K. and Forde,
P.; "The State Sector and Divestment in Trinidad and Tobago: Some Preliminary Findings" November 1991
24. Statement by Junior Finance Minister Ken Valley to Parliament, reported by the Trinidad Guardian o f April
24, 1993.
25. Ibid. Four o f  these enterprises had by then been sold, for almost US$ 200 million, a further ten were in various 
stages o f  divestment.
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